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Abstract
This thesis investigated the politically-charged responses of American and Canadian
newspapers, the New York Times, Washington Post, Globe and Mail, and Ottawa Citizen,
during October 1968 to the Mexico City massacre. Through a qualitative thematic analysis of
these newspapers, dominant themes of the massacre were identified and analyzed using
Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding paradigm. In this examination it was found that U.S.
newspapers provided knowledgeable and comprehensive reporting of the massacre while
Canadian newspapers presented only a cursory examination. The limited coverage of
Canadian newspapers was examined against other Canadian media sources and official
government and Olympic authority reports including: Canadian magazines Maclean’s and
Saturday Night, federal government speeches, debates in the House of Commons, and
Canadian Olympic Association personal documents and official reports. These divergent
presentations of the massacre in their newspapers reflected the historically unique
relationships each country had with Mexico, and prominence of the Olympics in world
politics.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chaos, loud explosions, gunfire, and uncertainty: These amongst other descriptors
have been used to describe the Mexico City massacre (also known, and interchangeably
referred to in this thesis, as the Tlatelolco massacre). The Mexico City massacre of 2
October 1968 occurred in the Tlatelolco section of Mexico City in the Plaza de las Tres
Culturas, when government troops fired upon a student demonstration which was taking
place in the square. The massacre ended with unconfirmed numbers of Mexican citizens
left killed, injured, and in prison for involvement in the Mexican student movement of
which the violence at Tlatelolco was a part. The Mexico City massacre has come to be
associated with the 1968 Mexico City Olympics because of the close proximity of the
two events, as the massacre occurred 10 days before the start of the Games.1
The massacre’s potential ramifications on the upcoming Olympics were evident.
If violence spilled over during the Olympics, the athletes, spectators, and facilities could
be put at risk. Those travelling to the Olympics from other countries were therefore
vulnerable if violence continued, putting citizens of many foreign nations into a situation
of uncertainty. The international response to the Mexico City massacre was varied;
countries broached the subject in divergent manners from supporting the continued
Mexican hosting of the Games, to calls for the Games to be moved. The non-uniform
responses to the massacre were potentially mediated by the fact that many citizens were
travelling into the maelstrom of political unrest soon after the massacre. What effect did
the impending entrance of citizens from countries around the world have on the
international responses to the massacre? Canada and the United States both sent large
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delegations to the Olympic Games, meaning the aftereffects of the massacre might well
impact on a significant number of citizens from each of these countries. Equally, both
countries had important political relationships with Mexico which brings into question
the possibility of these political relationships influencing the responses of each country to
the Mexico City massacre.
The relationships of Canada and the United States to Mexico were vastly different
in 1968. Canada and Mexico had only begun a diplomatic relationship in 1944, and
though their political relationships strengthened throughout the 1960s, the countries
remained relatively separate from one another politically and economically.2 The
Canadian-Mexican relationship could be characterized as one of burgeoning interest for
both parties, but one which ultimately was new and untested.3 Both countries appeared
eager to appeal to the other for mutual political and economic benefits. In 1965, Canada
sent 51 million dollars worth of exports to Mexico, third largest amongst Latin American
countries behind Venezuela and Cuba.4 The Canadian government seemed eager to
strengthen and enhance the flourishing Canadian-Mexican relationship as seen in the
example of the Pierre Trudeau’s government-sponsored, large mining mission to Latin
America wherein Mexico was featured prominently. 5
While the Canadian-Mexican relationship was blossoming anew, the United
States and Mexico held a long-standing, complicated and, at times, fractious though
close, relationship. Since the 19th century, conflict has been a pervasive feature of
American-Mexican relations. During these times of discord, America, as the larger and
more powerful country, imposed its will on Mexico.6 In 1845 War broke out between the
two countries over territorial disputes in Texas which culminated in American troops
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conquering Mexico City.7 Conflict continued as the United States intervened during the
Mexican Revolution, which began in 1910, by backing certain Mexican factions and also
by threatening to send its own troops into Mexico.8 Economically, the trade relationship
between the two nations was well-established by 1968 and, though the nations had a
trying past, the countries were inseparable. Trade agreements were struck in the 1880s
and continued to be enacted through the 1960s creating an extensive economic
relationship which benefitted both countries.9
The arduous relationship between America and Mexico historically bred a level of
fraternal pestering which took the form of each country ridiculing one another when the
opportunity presented itself. The 1968 Mexico City Olympics provided an ample
opportunity for both the United States and Mexico to antagonize the other with vindictive
reporting while knowing that their symbiotic relationship was already well established.
Segments of the American press began to lament the awarding of the Olympic Games to
Mexico City because they believed Mexicans incapable of hosting such an important
international event.10 Specifically irksome was the fact that Mexico City had been chosen
over Detroit. General feelings from the American press indicated a level of a superiority
complex Americans felt over the perceived inferior Mexicans. A number of verbal jabs
were directed towards the ineptitude and unreliability of Mexicans which would serve to
jeopardize the Olympic Games.11
The Mexican press, in turn, often volleyed criticism towards the Americans. In
the aftermath of the Mexico City massacre, for example, reports from the Mexican press,
and from government officials, implied that a meddlesome American Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) provoked Mexican students to demonstrate against the government.12
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Internal strife within American society was a relished opportunity for the Mexican press
and government to point out the inequities and problems within the United States. One
such instance occurred when student protests and demonstrations advocating for social
reforms were held in Chicago in 1968. Mexicans were eager to point this out in the press
as an example of America not being a utopian land where social inequality did not exist.13
The Mexico City massacre occurred during the Cold War era, which spanned
from 1946 until 1990. The Cold War had a profound influence on many global processes.
International relations, trade, commerce, travel, and cultural exchanges, among other
things, were all affected to some extent by the political tensions which characterized the
Cold War era.14 Examples of the effects of the political tensions of the Cold War
influencing global processes are numerous and include: the United States trade embargo
of Cuba and the restriction of travel for citizens of the Soviet Union on the basis of
nomenklatura, where only the privileged were afforded the ability to travel freely. 15
Tension during the Cold War was largely derived from political differences
between the western and the eastern blocs. The political blocs were comprised of nations
that aligned themselves with either of the two world superpowers, the United States or
Soviet Union. The political tensions experienced between western and eastern bloc
nations were the product of ideological differences (different systems of political ideas
and beliefs) between the capitalist west and the communist east which led to ideological
battles between both sides. These struggles of different political philosophies between the
west and the east took many different forms, such as proxy wars fought in satellite states
such as Vietnam, technological advancement in the race to the moon and the nuclear
arms race, and struggles through sport, to name a few. No matter the forum in which
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political battles were waged, the goal of these struggles remained the same: both the
western and eastern bloc nations intended to show the rest of the world, especially those
nations not aligned with either world power, that their ideologies and political structure
were superior to that of their rivals.16 Mexico, as an unaligned nation, was coveted by
both political blocs owing to its strategic location as a neighbor to the U.S.A. and its large
population and land area.
Sport provided a fertile stage on which these Cold War ideological struggles took
place. Essentially, sport was a venue where ideological battles were waged without the
fear of mutually assured military destruction occurring.17 Sport, as a product of the
political nature it took on during this time, became a symbolic form of political posturing.
The 1968 Mexico City Olympics fell within the politically-charged atmosphere of the
Cold War and, as a result, the Games were shaped by political considerations to a large
degree. While Cold War tensions escalated and dissipated sporadically throughout the
years, 1968 was a year in which tensions were unmistakably high.18 In 1968 the famous
student protests across France and the United States occurred, where many educated
youths voiced their concerns and displeasure with government policies, often in the form
of protest demonstrations. Western nations such as the United States feared the leftleaning nature of the worldwide student movement which was of great concern to the
governments that feared communism would envelop and distort these student
movements.19 The paranoia of western governments was reflected by the demonization of
all things thought to be associated with left-wing politics by connecting the political and
ideological left to communism and totalitarianism.
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The significant infusion of other politically-sensitive issues in 1968 brought Cold
War tensions into further focus beyond the 1968 student movement. One such event was
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In post-Second World War Europe,
Czechoslovakia fell within the Soviet sphere of influence and, as a result, it was forced,
under Soviet pressure, to take on the Soviet communist governance structure. The
Czechoslovaks, who had been part of a democratic nation before the war, began to protest
communist rule in the 1960s. The anti-communist demonstrations of the Czechoslovaks
against their communist government, and their Soviet puppeteers, hit a high water mark
in 1968 and, consequently, the Soviets invaded in 1968 to suppress the protest movement.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia crushed the anti-establishment protest movement
and returned Czechoslovakia to the pre-1968 status of a Soviet satellite state.20 As a
reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, many western nations expressed their
dismay by criticizing the Soviet invasion as an example of Soviet imperialism and the
disregard with which the Soviets viewed the sovereignty of other nations. Given the
proximity of Czechoslovakia to the western bloc, especially places such as Austria and
other European nations, the concern of western nations was that this invasion put other
western bloc countries at risk. The condemnation of the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia was clearly voiced in the many media articles published in the Globe and
Mail and the Ottawa Citizen and in the United States, in the New York Times and
Washington Post, during October 1968, shortly after the invasion occurred. Coverage of
the plight of Czechoslovak citizens was prominent within these popular newspapers,
creating a discourse in the popular media which demonized the Soviet’s flagrant violation
of sovereignty and human rights.
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The 1968 Mexico City Olympics were another event marked by a politicallycharged character. The 1968 Mexico City Olympics were fraught with political
influences and overtones from their outset. Mexico City officials, like those from many
other nations, desired to host the Olympics long before 1968, as they unsuccessfully bid
for the 1956 and 1960 Olympics.21 The Mexican government sought to exploit the
international attention given to the Olympics to provide the world with a positive glimpse
of Mexico and, thus, a positive view of the Mexican government itself and, in turn, the
nation.22 While many nations use the Olympics to ‘show off’ their countries to a global
audience, the Mexicans did so specifically to gain credibility in the eyes of industrialized
nations. According to Keith Brewster, the desire for acceptance among nations stemmed
from an inferiority complex held by many Mexicans, including their government, from
their history as a Spanish colony.23 Mexico had only become an independent nation from
Spain in 1810 which made Mexico a relatively young nation at the time of the 1968
Games. Additionally, the Mexican Revolution - a civil war- occurred from 1910 until at
least 1917.24 Such instability in combination with the youthfulness of the country
provided a potent mixture of reasons for the Mexican government to attempt to shine a
positive light on its country. The 1968 Games were positioned by Mexican officials as an
event which would lead to international confirmation of the development of the country.
The Olympics, the Mexican government felt, was an event which would show that
Mexico was a fully-transitioned first world nation.25
While the motivations for Mexico to host the Olympics were political, as most
Olympics were and are, the IOC’s decision to award Mexico the 1968 Olympic Games
was also politically motivated. The Olympic Games had become increasingly politicized
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with the introduction of the Soviet Union into the Olympic movement in 1952. The
Soviets, along with other eastern bloc nations, dominated the Olympic sport competitions
during the Cold War period in large part due to the state-sponsorship model these nations
employed. The state-sponsorship model allowed athletes to focus more intently on sport
as the state looked after trivial matters such as accommodation and food.26 The
dominance of eastern bloc athletes brought about a quasi-arms race towards the top of the
Olympic podium as both eastern and western bloc nations alike began to treat the
Olympics as a de-facto political arena. The IOC, with rhetoric which stated the Olympic
Games were free from political interference, became enveloped in the Cold War tensions
upon Soviet re-entry to the Olympics in 1952.
The Olympics, during the Cold War, especially post-1952, took on more symbolic
political importance. The 1956 Melbourne Olympics provided an early example. The
water-polo match at the Melbourne Games between the Soviets and Hungary turned
violent. This violence mimicked the significant political friction between the two nations
at the time, in light of the Soviet quashing of Hungarian protests against communist
rule.27 Another example of the political nature of the Olympics during the Cold War was
the doping culture which resulted from a win-at-all-costs mentality which was prevalent
because of the desire of nations to win as many medals as possible. By winning medals,
many nations believed they appeared superior to rival bloc nations. A culture of suspicion
developed, and western nations often accused the Soviets and other eastern bloc nations
of doping and cheating. For example, American gold medalist, Rob Strachan, stated, “If
you look at the East Germans, they don’t look exactly like they’re girls. They’re quite a
bit bigger than most of the men on the American team. They could go out for football at
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USC. They’ve got some big guys there.”28 The IOC, as a result, was keen to avoid further
antagonizing the western nations by granting the Olympic Games to cities within the
eastern bloc. Likewise, the IOC, to maintain the image of political neutrality, did not
want to further isolate eastern bloc nations by awarding the Olympic Games to western
bloc nations.29
The 1963 IOC meeting in Baden Baden West Germany to vote for the right to
host the 1968 Olympics brought the political orientation of the 1968 Olympic Games into
greater clarity. The candidate cities to host the 1968 Olympic Games were: Buenos Aires,
Detroit, Lyon, and Mexico City. Detroit and Lyon were cities of leading western bloc
nations, the U.S.A. and France respectively, and the IOC counted this fact against those
two cities for fear of antagonizing eastern bloc nations.30 Buenos Aires was a city in
turmoil, given a recent military coup which occurred in Argentina in 1962-1963.31 The
final vote count reflected these tensions as Mexico City won by virtue of simply not
being firmly within either bloc and it appeared stable when juxtaposed with the
tumultuous nature of Buenos Aires at the time. The IOC viewed Mexico as both outside
of Cold War considerations and as a nation which was booming economically with
annual growth rates between five and six percent throughout the 1960s and up to seven
percent in 1967.32 These criteria gave the IOC confidence that the political overtones of
the 1968 Games may have been lessened and that the Games were to be hosted in a stable
and peaceful nation which assured the safety of those attending.
While Mexico City, and Mexico as a whole, was viewed globally as a beacon of
hope and progress in Latin America in terms of social and political stability, the country
was fraught with tensions throughout the lead-up to the Olympic Games.33 The civil
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unease in the months before the Games in the summer months of 1968 were not,
however, an unprecedented aspect of Mexican society. Social unrest had long been a
hallmark of Mexican society and the accompaniment of demonstrations to add to the
unrest was not uncommon. Demonstrations generally occurred in Mexico because groups
of citizens were dissatisfied by social inequity and ineffective economic policies.
Following the history of social demonstrations by Mexican citizens, such as the doctors,
rail workers, or teachers’ strikes of the 1950s, Mexican students began to publically
display their disenchantment with both Mexican society and the government.34
The Mexican student movement developed in late July 1968 initially as a reaction
to the heavy handedness of riot police who were responding to clashes between rival
Mexican student groups.35 The effect of the gruff handling of the situation between
student groups by police had the consequence of uniting student groups within Mexico
against a common enemy: the state. Throughout August and September 1968, the student
movement in Mexico swelled in popularity. Some 200,000 people protested against the
government on 13 August and 300,000 marched in anger on 27 August.36 As the Mexican
student movement grew in both sheer numbers and visibility given the public nature of
the protests, so grew the concern of the Mexican government over the character of the
student movement. The Mexican government feared outside influences, like Cuban
communists, who posed the risk of distorting the student movement.37 The combination
of an increasingly sophisticated and prominent student movement and a worried
government came to loggerheads in September 1968. On 18 September, the military
invaded Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, UNAM, after a battle between
students and the army which left unconfirmed numbers of students dead.38 The rest of
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September went by with relative calm as student demonstrations did not reach the size
and scale of those previously described, perhaps for fear of renewed brutal government
suppression. On 1 October the American ambassador in Mexico City, Covey T. Oliver,
contently wired home, “Tensions seem to be easing in Mexico City.”39
The relative tranquility of the later part of September and early October 1968 was
shattered by the Mexico City massacre on 2 October 1968. At the time of the massacre,
those who were present in Mexico City described a hectic event which led to various
stories of what happened in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas. While the accounts of the
Mexico City massacre vary, certain features of the various accounts appear consistent. At
about 6:00 PM on 2 October Mexican government helicopters flew above the square in
Tlatelolco, an area of Mexico City, where student demonstrators, numbering roughly
5,000, were holding a protest.40 The demonstrations of the students on this fateful day
were described as having a “picniclike” atmosphere.41 Shortly after the government
helicopters flew over the square, possibly only minutes after, the Olimpia Battalian- a
secret Mexican security force trained for the Olympics- and army troops sealed all exits
from the square. The Mexican government forces proceeded to fire on the crowd from the
balconies that lined the square, which caused many fatalities. The killing lasted for over
an hour before briefly subsiding and then resuming until about 11:00 PM.42 In all it has
been estimated, though not confirmed, between 300 and 400 were killed, while roughly
2,000 are thought to have been jailed as punishment for their involvement in the
demonstration.43 Wild stories proliferated in the aftermath of the massacre as to what had
happened. British journalist John Rodda of the Guardian went so far as to describe that
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he heard that the bodies of student protestors were being dropped into the Gulf of
Mexico.44
The international response to Tlatelolco was varied. Generally accounts of the
international response to the massacre showed that the international community
maintained support of the continued hosting of the Olympic Games in Mexico City and
rarely was criticism directed at the Mexican government.45 The U.S. government was
concerned about the safety of American athletes and tourists attending the Olympics;
however, it supported the Mexican government and the continued hosting of the
Olympics in Mexico. Japan, hosts of the preceding Olympic Games of Tokyo 1964,
showed its support for the Games to go ahead through a telegram of encouragement sent
to Mexico. Giulio Onesti, an Italian Olympic Committee member, and Berge Phillips, an
Australian, differed in that they responded to the massacre with trepidation and concern
as evidenced by their co-signed letter which stated they had a “serious preoccupation due
to the events which prejudice the Olympic atmosphere and serenity.”46
Determining the responses of various Canadian institutions to Tlatelolco sheds
light upon the political climate of Canadian society in 1968 and also illuminates the
manner in which Canadians regarded the importance of the safety of their athletes in
Mexico City. Mere days after the events of 2 October at Tlatelolco, Canada sent its
athletic delegation, comprised of 144 competitors, 34 officials, 21 journalists and “many
more” TV personnel to cover the 1968 Mexico City Olympics.47 Canada, in 1968,
positioned itself as a highly moral country which stood up for human rights throughout
the world. Examples of the moral posturing of Canada are abundant and Secretary of
State for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp’s speech on October 9, 1968 to the United
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Nations General Assembly provides an illustration of Canada’s moral stance. In the
speech Sharp explained that Canada, “cannot accept that a community of interest, real or
alleged, political, cultural, or economic, entitles one country to take upon itself the right
to interfere in the internal affairs of another.” Sharp went on to describe the immorality of
the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia and the need for the international
community to uphold human rights in worn-torn Nigeria.48 Furthermore, by 1968 Canada
had started developing stronger political and economic ties to Latin American countries;
in fact diplomatic relations with the Mexicans were established in 1944.49
The preparation of the United States Olympic team for the 1968 Olympic Games
was dominated by issues of race relations. The civil rights movement in the United States
which called for equal opportunities for African-Americans penetrated the American
sport movement in the late 1960s.50 Many black athletes called for equality in a sport
system where many felt themselves pawns being abused by the white-dominated
American sport system.51 This awakening of African American athlete calls for equality
was augmented by an Olympic boycott movement initiated by many countries to protest
the IOC’s reluctance to disqualify South Africa, site of Apartheid racist policies towards
blacks, provided another reason besides the racial inequality in American sport for
African-American athlete discontent entering the 1968 Games.52 The boycott movement
provided a divisive feature of American preparations for the Olympics, as some, most
notably UCLA’s basketball superstar Lew Alcindor (later Kareem Abdul-Jabbar)
boycotted the Olympics. Sentiments were expressed by many of the virtues or downfall a
boycott would bring.53 Former African-American athletes such as Jesse Owens and
Jackie Robinson refused to support the growing calls for African-American athletes to
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boycott the Games, while equally certain members of the U.S. Olympic team, notably the
track athletes Tommie Smith and Lee Evans, felt a boycott was an effective way to
protest the racial inequalities in America.54 The boycott movement amongst American
athletes eventually dwindled to the point where only a few, though notable in Alcindor’s
case, refused to participate in the Olympics. The disaffected athletes refused, however, to
rule out the possibility of demonstrating their unhappiness with the racial environment of
the United States.
Review of Literature
The copious amount and depth of the general Cold War literature provides strong
foundations for study of particular events which occurred during the Cold War, such as,
in this case, the Mexico City massacre. Extensive bodies of knowledge of the Cold War
are available and these include: Peter Kenez’s A History of the Soviet Union from the
Beginning to the End, and the academic journal Cold War History. A multitude of other
sources provide excellent overviews of the events and the associated political tensions
which characterized the Cold War period. For the purposes of this thesis, certain works
which focused explicitly on 1968-a particularly volatile year- provide important and
meaningful insights into the many significant events which occurred during the year.
Mark Kurlansky’s 1968: The Year that Rocked the World and Sheman, Van Dijk,
Alinder, and Aneesh, eds., The Long 1968: Revisions and New Perspectives both portray,
in vivid detail, the student demonstration movement of 1968 amongst other formative
events such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
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The accessibility of numerous Cold War works allowed me to taper my review of
literature further therefore enabling me to determine the viability of my research topic.
The result of the narrowing of my review of literature was achieved by reviewing sources
which placed the Olympic Games in political contexts. Upon a review of literature there
appears to be a wealth of sources describing the political nature of the Olympic Games.
Many of these sources communicate the precise ways in which the Olympic Games have
been subjugated to political influences throughout the event’s history.55 The Soviet
Union’s political uses of Olympic sport were documented by historian James Riordan in
Sport in the Soviet Union. Riordan explained that the Soviet sport system aimed at
gaining international recognition through sport. John Hoberman documented the political
uses of the Olympic Games during the Cold War era in Olympic Crisis: Sport Politics
and the Moral Order. He explained why certain actions such as the boycotts of the 1980
and 1984 Olympics occurred due to political considerations. Other works, such as
Olympic Politics by Christopher Hill, Alfred Senn’s Power, Politics and the Olympic
Games: A History of the Power Brokers, Events, and Controversies that shaped the
Games, and Kevin Wamsley’s The Global Sport Monopoly provide overviews of the
politics of the Olympic Games throughout their history. Examples used in these works
include the 1936 Nazi Olympics, the boycotted 1980 and 1984 Olympics, and the
political uses of the Olympics by countries to project a positive reflection of their
countries to a worldwide audience.
Upon reviewing the literature regarding the political uses of the Olympic Games,
the scope of my literature review was again narrowed to the Olympic Games and politics
during the Cold War era. The majority of the literature regarding the Olympics and
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politics placed a great amount of focus upon the effects of politics on the Olympics
during the Cold War, but other examples like the 1936 Nazi Olympics were discussed.
The existing literature of the Olympic Games and politics during the Cold War was
abundant and the effects of external world political conditions upon the Olympics became
extenuated and more noticeable as the Cold War progressed between 1946 and 1991.
Essentially, the Olympics, during the Cold War became a venue for eastern and western
bloc nations to wage proxy-political warfare, and the Games, as a result, became
increasingly political.56 A large quantity of the Cold War literature in this respect
examines the Cold War Games of 1980 and 1984 and, thereby, the tensions between the
two most prominent actors in the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. Additionally,
significant research has focused upon the rivalry between eastern and western bloc
nations in Olympic competition. Examples of the study between Soviet and American
rivalry to achieve the best possible results at the Games include Thomas Hunt’s Sports,
Drugs, and the Cold War: The Conundrum of Olympic Doping Policy, 1970-1979 which
documents how drug use was utilized by these rivals as a way to gain advantage over one
another. This Cold War Olympic literature provides an excellent framework and
foundation which grounds this study of the 1968 Olympics to the political contexts which
occurred during the lead-up to and hosting of the Mexico City Games. Due to the
political nature of the Olympic Games, an historical-political lens is best suited for this
study.57
The 1968 Mexico City Olympic literature, upon review, has not predominantly
focused upon Tlatelolco. The existing 1968 Mexico City Olympic Games English
language literature largely revolves around the Black Power protest of Tommy Smith and
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John Carlos. The Black Power protest occurred on the podium after the 200m final at the
1968 Games when Smith and Carlos, African-American Olympic athletes, raised their
fists as a symbolic demonstration against the racial policies of the United States.
Excellent research has been conducted on this event, and Amy Bass’s work Not the
Triumph but the Struggle, Douglas Hartmann’s Race, Culture and the Revolt of the Black
Athlete, and Simon Henderson’s book chapter ‘Nasty Demonstrations by Negroes’: The
place of the Smith-Carlos Podium Salute in the Civil Rights Movement are amongst the
examples of scholarly literature regarding the Black Power salute.58 These works
effectively plot the course of events which precipitated the Black Power protest and also
successfully investigate the effects of the protest thereafter. The predominance of 1968
Olympic research studying the Black Power salute has likely resulted from the interest
the event garnered by North American researchers because of the involvement of
American athletes.
In addition to the large body of literature regarding Tommy Smith and John
Carlos, 1968 Olympic literature has also focused upon the effects and concerns of hosting
the Olympics at altitude. The Mexico City Games represented the first time in Olympic
history that the Olympic Games were hosted at altitude, which raised concerns of many
nations about its effects on athletic performance.59 Like the altitude literature, research
has also been conducted on the introduction of drug and gender testing of athletes for the
1968 Olympics.60 Neither the altitude nor the doping literature is as abundant as the
Black Power literature, though a significant amount of research has been conducted to
address both issues.
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In comparison to the abundance of literature examining the Black Power protest,
research examining the 1968 Mexico City massacre appears to be much more limited.
Some excellent research on Tlatelolco has been conducted, notably by Kevin
Witherspoon and Keith and Claire Brewster. The Mexico City massacre literature has
largely revolved around the precipitating factors which caused the massacre to take
place.61 These causal factors were, namely, the social and political situation of Mexico in
1968 which caused disaffected Mexican students to demonstrate against government rule.
Income inequality and an authoritarian government structure were major factors which
inspired the Mexican student movement.62 Kevin Witherspoon concluded that the United
States was acutely aware of the happenings in the Mexican student movement, including
the massacre. The high level of American interest in the student movement was
precipitated by their concern that the student movement was directed by communists.
Equally, this paranoia that communism had grasped the Mexican student movement also
explains the American placating of the Mexican government’s murderous suppression of
the massacre.63 Keith and Claire Brewster’s research has focused on the intersection of
the Olympics and the student movement and is generally descriptive in nature, not
offering specific arguments but rather describing the student movement and the massacre
as it happened according to archival sources and first-hand recollections.64
A specific analysis of newspaper representations of the Mexico City massacre has
not been conducted. In Before the Eyes of the World, Witherspoon examined the New
York Times and selected other newspapers. However, this was done as a part of his much
larger project which inspected the 1968 Games in a much broader sense. As a result,
Witherspoon was not solely focused on the newspaper representations of the massacre,
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and the meaning structures implicit within these representations. Upon reviewing the
literature, it is evident that no research has been conducted to examine the Canadian
response to Tlatelolco, and no study has been devoted solely to examining the responses
of American newspapers to the massacre. The lack of research on the Canadian and
American newspaper responses to the Mexico City massacre therefore highlights a gap in
the Olympic studies literature which my research addresses. The significance of my
research lies in the development of an understanding of how the external historicalpolitical factors of 1968 and the Cold War impacted upon two nations differently.
Specifically, significance is gained from considering how a western bloc middle power
nation, Canada, and the leader of the western bloc, the United States, confronted the
historical-political context of 1968 and the Cold War, and how their confrontations
manifested themselves in the newspaper reporting on Tlatelolco. The existing literature
falls short in assessing international reactions to the Mexico City massacre.
Purpose
The goal of this research is to analyze the immediate reactions of major Canadian
and American newspapers to the Mexico City massacre. Immediacy in this thesis will
refer to the Canadian and American press reaction from 2 October- 31 October.
Rationale
The Mexico City massacre represented a level of violence and brutality
previously unmatched in Olympic history. As mentioned, Canada, at the time of the
massacre in 1968, positioned itself as a highly moral nation. Research into the Canadian
response to Tlatelolco will provide insights into external factors that molded the
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Canadian response, and the context of its response given its publically-stated moral
posture on human rights.
By contrast, the United States during 1968 found itself at the head of the western
political bloc and as one of the world’s two superpowers. The Americans eagerly extolled
the virtues of the capitalist, democratic west and derided what they saw as the dictatorial,
communist east. A significant degree of ‘moralizing’ was done by the Americans to
clearly show how their system was democratic and just, and how communism was
authoritarian and unjust. By analyzing the newspaper treatments of the Mexico City
massacre, insights into how the newspapers handled events where leftist political aims
were central were made through careful examination of these newspaper reports of
Tlatelolco.
The rationale for analyzing newspapers relies upon John E. Richardson’s
Analysing Newspapers: An approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. In this book
Richardson states, “The sourcing and construct of the news is intimately linked with the
actions and opinions of (usually powerful) social groups.”65 Richardson also claims that
the power and significance of news journalism to contemporary society warrants
examination and scrutiny because of the power effects journalism has in informing the
general population of news events.66 The language used in newspaper discourse is social,
enacts identity, is active, has power, and is political according to Richardson’s view of
language.67 Richardson’s assumptions align with Stuart Hall’s theoretical approaches to
the examination of media discourse which were used to analyze data in this thesis. Hall
argued that news is encoded with implicit meaning structures which are politically
oriented and that news is decoded by audiences with meaning structures which are
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likewise political in nature.68 Additionally, journalism according to Richardson is
undeniably interconnected to the social, political, and cultural context in which it is
written and consumed, which again makes Richardson’s rationale for studying
newspapers compatible with Hall’s encoding/decoding paradigm. As a result, these
contextual considerations must be recognized and accounted for when analyzing
newspaper discourse.69
Method
This research will take the form of a qualitative analysis and will be conducted
from a traditional historiographical perspective. This historiography is based upon the
Report of the Committee on Historiography of the Social Science Research Council
(1954) which states that historiography is the study and criticism of the sources inherent
in the development of history. Critically analyzing the historical sources upon which my
thesis was constructed aligns with my critical theorist underpinnings which dictate that I
do not simply accept these sources as truth. I used a thematic analysis to interpret and
analyze the data that I collected and I relied on Judith Lapadat’s method of thematic
analysis.70 I employed a thematic analysis because of its flexibility and potential to
cluster collected data into themes which can be easily analyzed for inherent meanings.
This thesis was informed by the writings of Stuart Hall on representation and
ideology, and Chris Rojek’s interpretation and appropriation of Hall’s writings. Hall
argues that discourse within the media is shaped by ideology and many of his projects
focused on exposing and unpacking the ways in which ideology shaped media
messages.71 Hall sought to draw out the media’s role in advancing some narratives and
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meanings, while silencing or marginalizing other points of view and thereby constructing
reality.72 Through certain ways of understanding media messages, Hall describes these
ways of knowing as ‘codes;’ media messages serve different purposes. The particular
effects of media messages range from tacit acceptance by the audience, to a negotiated
acceptance of media messages, to rejection of the media messages by the audience.
Following Hall, popular media constitutes a contested terrain or battlefield where
resistance and opposition occur to varying degrees.73
My examination of various Canadian and American newspaper responses to the
Mexico City massacre is situated within the political, historical, and social context in
which the massacre occurred. This analysis examines the ways in which the reactions of
major newspapers in Canada and the United States to Tlatelolco were shaped by the
political atmosphere of the Cold War and the Olympic Games. The discourses created in
the popular media and by the government were foundations which ordered reality in
certain ways by both enabling and constraining the production of knowledge on these
events.74 The analysis also sheds light on why these discourses were created in light of
the historical-political context of 1968.
My research was conducted from a critical theorist epistemological and
ontological position. My worldviews constitute that I interpret reality not as a concrete,
universal concept but something which is socially constructed through discourse. My
personal beliefs, given my epistemological position, mean that I view reactions and
responses to events, in this case the 1968 Mexico City massacre, to be socially
constructed within the framework of socio-cultural and historical-political conditions.
Since this thesis is a critical examination, I believe that power relations influence the
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construction of discourses surrounding events, as I believe the newspaper response to
Tlatelolco was influenced by the economic and political relations pursued by Canada and
the United States with Mexico and by Cold War context. These paradigmatic
underpinnings are reflected in my interpretations and explanations of why the responses
to Tlatelolco occurred as they did. My thematic analysis represents my paradigmatic
viewpoints which inform my interpretive analysis of the various Canadian and American
newspaper responses to the massacre. In concert with a thematic analysis, the
encoding/decoding of information provided a foundation from which I analyzed the
meaning structures contained within these newspaper reports.
The primary source data which was collected for this research was largely in the
form of periodicals. The periodicals examined were Canada’s Globe and Mail and
Ottawa Citizen and the United States’ New York Times and Washington Post. Each day,
every page from 2 October to 31 October was examined in all periodicals. Other primary
sources analyzed to provide context to this study included government of Canada
speeches and statements from October 1968, the October 1968 House of Commons
Debates, Canadian magazines Maclean’s and Saturday Night from October 1968, and the
James Worrall papers, the personal correspondences of the former C.O.A. President and
Canada’s IOC member during 1968, located at Western University in the International
Centre for Olympic Studies (ICOS). Documents in this collection include material
pertinent to the 1968 Olympics, including letters, personal correspondences, and press
releases.
The responses of the New York Times and Washington Post to Tlatelolco lend to
an understanding of how certain major American newspapers reported on an event which
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United States intelligence in Mexico was closely monitoring.75 The reporting of these two
major American newspapers also reflects how the fractious and often tense relationship
between the United States and Mexico exhibited itself in the reporting of this seminal
event in Mexican history. Taken together, this analysis of both Canadian and American
newspapers will elucidate the differences between the two countries reporting of the
massacre, and provide reasons as to why these differences presented themselves as they
did.
The items which were reviewed were strategically selected because they were
determined to be the sources most likely to contain significant coverage of the Mexico
City massacre. The Canadian newspapers selected were the Globe and Mail and the
Ottawa Citizen. The Globe was examined because it was Canada’s only national
newspaper at the time, and thus more likely to report on issues of national and
international significance as opposed to local newspapers. The Citizen was selected
because of its popularity as the newspaper of note in the nation’s capital, and, as well, in
a major Canadian city where stories of national and international significance were more
likely to be published. Owing to the factors described, both newspapers were deemed to
be among the most likely newspapers in Canada to devote significant attention to the
Mexico City massacre. The American newspapers selected were the New York Times and
the Washington Post. The selection of these papers mirrored the rationale for selecting
the Globe and Mail and Ottawa Citizen in Canada. The New York Times is the major
newspaper of the largest city in the United States and doubled as the de-facto national
newspaper for America. As a result, the international flavour of the New York Times news
coverage was distinctive and abundant. The Washington Post is the main newspaper of
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the United States capital city, and is a politically attuned newspaper reporting extensively
on national and international political events.
Other sources utilized were the Canadian House of Commons debates, along with
speeches and statements made by the Minister of External Affairs, which were
determined to be the most likely sources to locate the Canadian national government
responses to Tlatelolco. Canadian popular magazines were also studied and those selected
for inspection were Maclean’s magazine and Saturday Night. These popular Canadian
magazines were amongst the dominant print media outlets informing the Canadian public
of current events and therefore likely to feature coverage of the Mexico City massacre.
To understand the Canadian Olympic Association (C.O.A.) response to the massacre the
official C.O.A. report was reviewed in addition to the James Worrall papers.
Secondary sources were selected to provide insights into the Mexico City
Olympics, the student movement of 1968, the Cold War during 1968, and CanadianMexican relations. The databases SPORTDiscus and LA84 were used to search for
scholarly articles regarding the Mexico City Olympics. Search terms used included:
Tlatelolco, Mexico City massacre, 1968 Mexico City Olympics, and combinations of
those three. Through the articles retrieved, cross-referencing was undertaken to ensure a
representative and substantive literature review was completed.
The data collected was analyzed qualitatively by placing the newspaper coverage
of the massacre into themes. This was accomplished through the use of axial coding,
whereby articles which exhibited similar characteristics were placed into categories from
which the themes were generated. Examples of themes included the conflation of the
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massacre with the Olympics. If reports of the massacre made reference to the Olympics
Games, such as the impact the massacre may have had on the Games or the students
protesting was in response to the Olympics, these reports were placed into the same
category. From these categories, of which there were many, themes were expanded upon.
Once themes were delineated, data analysis was driven by Stuart Hall’s
encoding/decoding paradigm. This qualitative cultural studies tool allowed my
excavation of the meaning structures encoded and decoded from the newspaper reports of
the Mexico City massacre.
After the examination of the encoded and decoded meaning structures contained
within the newspaper reports was carried out, explanations for these meaning structures
were provided. Focus on the historical-political conditions of 1968, specifically the
Canadian and American relationships to Mexico, allowed for interpretations of the
meaning structures.
Limitations
The major limitation of my research resulted from my inability to read Spanish.
This served to make this research a study of only English language sources pertinent to
the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. Another limitation was that no interviews were
conducted in this study which makes my research reliant on interpretations by others, be
they researchers, journalists, or eye-witnesses.

27

Delimitations
This thesis explored the immediate, October 1968, selected Canadian and
American major newspaper responses to the 1968 Mexico City Massacre. Further, my
research of the national government response to the event was restricted to only those
responses which were made in public, such as in the House of Commons debates, and
does not examine personal correspondences of government officials. The Canadian and
American media response in my research only focuses upon print sources and does not
consider television and radio interpretations of the massacre. Other Canadian primary
sources examined in conjunction with the newspapers also provide limitations. The
C.O.A.’s response to the massacre will be restricted to those documents found in the
James Worrall papers from October to November 1968. Owing to previous scholarship
which examined declassified CIA and other American primary sources pertinent to the
massacre, this thesis relied upon secondary sources in concert with my examination of
two American newspapers.
Chapter Outline
Chapter two describes the political-historical context in which the Tlatelolco
massacre occurred. This chapter examines the many factors leading to the emergence of
the Mexican student movement, in addition to determining why Mexico City was
awarded the Olympic Games. Chapter two also scrutinizes the Olympic Games leading
up to Mexico City 1968. Additionally, attention will be given to the many other political
events which occurred during 1968, as they may have influenced the Canadian and
American newspaper responses to Tlatelolco.
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Chapter three describes the American newspaper response to Tlatelolco. This
chapter explores the Americans newspaper response to the massacre grounded in the
historical-political context in which the massacre occurred.
Chapter four examines the Canadian response to the Mexico City massacre. The
reactions of different entities, such as the Canadian media and the Canadian Olympic
Association, are examined, compared, and contrasted to delineate consensus reactions
and responses to the massacre. These explanations are grounded in the historical-political
factors of 1968 which mediated the Canadian response to Tlatelolco. Chapter five will
provide conclusions to my thesis and also will provide future directions for research
regarding the 1968 Mexico City massacre.
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Chapter 2: Context
The Mexico City massacre was an unprecedented event in both Mexican and
Olympic history. The historical development of both the Mexican state and the Olympic
Games provide some understanding as to why the massacre occurred in the manner it did.
Mexican society, from its days as the Spanish colony New Spain, up to 1968 was
characterized by societal inequality. Inequalities stemmed from racial stratification in
New Spain, where equal opportunities were not afforded to all, and power was
consolidated in the hands of very few. A large gap between the privileged few and the
rest of the citizenry continued through the 19th and 20th centuries. Coupled with societal
inequalities which had long existed in Mexico were displays of unrest because of the
gross differences in quality of life. Protests occurred on a consistent basis, and these
protests often turned into armed struggles which led to political upheaval. Wars of
Independence against the Spanish, conflicts with foreign powers, notably France and the
United States, and the Mexican Revolution are examples of societal unrest boiling over
into battles which left Mexico a country in fairly consistent turmoil. The 1968 Mexican
student movement, too, attempted to confront inequality through protests and
demonstrations.
The 1968 Olympic Games were in many ways an attempt by the Mexican
government to re-orient the reputation of Mexico to the world. The Mexican government
hoped that the Olympic Games would provide an opportunity to showcase Mexico
internationally as a stable, prosperous, and developed country which had left its
combustible image in the past. The Olympic Games had become an increasingly common
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site for political gesticulations, as numerous host countries attempted to portray positive
images internationally.
The Mexican student movement in 1968 gained momentum as the Olympics
loomed on the horizon, placing in jeopardy the positive image of the country as Olympic
host. Social unrest during 1968 conflating the Mexican student movement and the
Olympic Games combined to create a cauldron of turmoil. The massacre was the
exclamation mark on the rising tensions in Mexico, and provided a gruesome end to the
student protests.
The Beginnings
The history of Mexico is one punctuated by inequality and regime change. From
the origins of the area Mexico currently inhabits, Mesoamerican groups replaced one
another through armed conflict.1 The most famous amongst the Mesoamerican ancestors
of the Mexican state were the Aztecs. An advanced and civilized people who built
innovative cities with canals and causeways, the Aztecs nonetheless produced a greatly
stratified civilization. These cities were ruled by systems of laws and courts of justice
which provided the bedrock of Aztec society. Aztec civilization, however, had class
divisions and the judiciary was likewise divided along class lines. For example, the
nobility were tried by special courts, while other members of society were tried in
different courts of law signifying the inequality inherent within Aztec society.2 The
Aztecs, however, were supplanted in present day Mexico by Spanish colonizers-also
known as conquistadors- in the 1500s. Famously, Hernán Cortés, a Spaniard, commanded
a Spanish expedition, commissioned by Diego Velázguez, onto the Mexican peninsula.
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Cortes and his men conquered the Aztecs by both peaceful and, more famously, through
violent means as exemplified in the battles waged from 1519-1521. Conquest continued
by expanding the newly conquered Spanish territory and, by 1550, the conquistadors had
subdued the Aztecs to such an extent that the foundations for a ‘New Spain’ were firmly
in place.3
New Spain and Growing Pains
New Spain, like other Spanish colonial possessions, was a territory of the Spanish
monarchy whose rule was centralized and absolute. New Spain featured a segregated
society, where Spanish settlers were held to certain standards and ‘natives’ to others. The
differentiation was reflected in many ways, for example, in religious differences, such as
Indian Catholicism and traditional Catholicism, and also in social stratification where
‘natives’ were positioned below Spaniards.4 The physical distance of New Spain from the
Spanish monarchy dictated that viceroys and governors in New Spain took on more
decision-making power and influence.5
In the 17th and early 18th centuries, New Spain entrenched the differences between
it and mother Spain, and distinct political, social, economic, and cultural orders were
established. These aspects of New Spanish society were underscored by ethnic and social
categories which stemmed from the intercultural mixing of Spaniards, natives, and slaves
which they brought with them. As a result, a heterogeneous population was stratified by
the ruling governance structure into distinctions based on ‘race.’ These distinctions were:
mulattos (‘black’ and ‘white’), mestizos (‘Indian’ and ‘white’), zambos (‘Indian’ and
‘black’), indios (‘Indians’), negros (‘blacks’), criollos (Spaniards born in the New
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World), and peninsulares (Spaniards born in Spain).6 Through these different racial
classifications, marginalization or opportunity could be offered or denied from birth.
Peninsulares had the most privileged position in New Spanish society, as they made up
the elite portion of society and acted as land owners, merchants, royal or government
officials, and professionals, like doctors and lawyers. On the other hand, criollos, and
those of mixed racial heritage to an even greater extent, were marginalized and not
allowed to enter the clergy or universities and thereby deprived of the chance to serve as
royal or provincial administrators. Those of mixed heritage, be they mulatto or mestizo,
were classified as castas-‘half-breeds’- finding work in labour venues such as transport,
livestock, and mining centers.7 The inequities and stratification found in New Spain were
profound and rigid.
Independence
Change within New Spain occurred in some part due to the social stratification of
different ethnic groups. The Seven Years War of 1756-1763 in Europe had the
destabilizing effect of ushering in changes, with respect to the governance of Spanish
colonies. Known as the Bourbon reforms, taxes were increased, different authorities were
put in charge of Spanish colonial territory, and laws were amended.8 This constant flux
led to discontent within New Spain. New World-born Spaniards were angered by the
European-born Spaniards who replaced them in administrative duties. The criollos and
castas began to express discontent at their limited opportunities within society. After the
Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1804, further changes were felt in New Spain, and the
bubbling discontent of the various segments of Mexican society began to express itself in
a national awakening.9 Conflicts raged between those who wanted independence from
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Spain and those who wished to remain a Spanish colony. In 1810, independence was
declared and, after bloody conflicts resulted, eventually in 1821 Mexico was recognized
as independent.10
The newly independent Mexico was characterized by chaos. Violence was
commonplace as seen during the Caste War (1847-1854); war with the United States in
1846; the Pastry War of the 1830s (a conflict between the French and Mexico); and the
Second Franco-Mexican war from 1861-1867, amongst other conflicts.11 Mexico, in the
mid-1800s had made little progress in creating a sustainable system of governance and a
social contract to hold its heterogeneous peoples and regions together.12
The wars brought indelible chaos during the conflicts, but in their aftermath
stability was gradually gained. The Second Franco-Mexican war, most notably, brought a
military hero to the fore, setting his path to become a stabilizing and influential figure in
Mexican history. Porfirio Díaz was a General in the Mexican army who enjoyed military
successes against the French. During the latter stages of the French-Mexican conflict,
Diaz rose rapidly in the Mexican political hierarchy.13 When Benito Juárez, the elected
President, died of a heart attack in 1872, Porfirio Díaz surfaced as his successor.14 In the
wake of the numerous conflicts Mexico had been involved in since its War of
Independence, the country was unstable and underdeveloped which lent to the perception
amongst industrialized nations that Mexico was an uncivilized mess.15 Porfirio Díaz,
President of Mexico after a coup d’état in 1876, charted a course towards transforming
the country into a modern nation. Political stability was secured under his iron-fisted rule.
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Porfirian modernization began with the political stability his rule brought. It
followed that economic development by way of industrialization and foreign investment
flourished in the peaceful environment that characterized Diaz’s rule.16 Foreign
investment was significantly greater than it had been previously and Mexico’s gross
national product (GNP) grew an astounding eight percent between 1884 and 1900.17 The
benefits of the increased GNP brought about prosperity for the elite, who spent lavishly
on Parisian-style mansions equipped with indoor plumbing, and electric lights. Ninety
percent of Mexico’s population, however, did not reap the rewards of the booming
national economy.18 The inequities of the modernizing Mexican society were also
reflected in regional disparities of development. The northern economies of Mexico
flourished with modern technology and factories which supported a thriving export
market of textiles, steel, mining, coffee, sugar, and henequen. The successful north
contrasted starkly against the agrarian regions of central Mexico which did not feature
significant mechanization.19 Similarly, inequities of gender were noticeable as women
were not afforded the same opportunities as men with respect to work, leisure activities,
and personal freedoms.20
Modernization was also evident in the sophisticated equipment afforded to the
military, railroads construction, and communications such as the telegraph.21 Public
education became a top priority of the ruling government as schools had the possibility of
inculcating the virtues of the Mexican nation and government to impressionable children.
Namely, schools could instill a love for work, the nation, and respect for the law and
Mexican authorities.22 Of course, there were also racial reasons for the educational
reforms. Public schools open to all children, sought to transform ‘Indians,’ believed less
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loyal to Mexico than those who were white, into ‘social assets.’23 The emphasis of
schooling can be seen as another feature of the modernization of Mexico during the Díaz
years.
In Díaz’s time, he removed shackles on trade, privatized rural community
landholding, brought unions under government control, and recruited foreign investment
to nourish industry and technology.24 The increased relative wealth of Mexicans during
Díaz’s reign brought about increased pluralism, sentiments of nationalism, and
dissatisfaction that so much power and wealth resided in the hands of so few.25 The
dictatorial nature of Díaz’s rule, and the associated societal inequities, eventually ran its
course.
Mexican Revolution
The bubble of the Díaz era burst spectacularly as the Mexican Revolution, a series
of conflicts which began in 1910 and have no universally accepted end date with
estimates ranging from 1917 to after the Second World War, changed the face of Mexico.
The revolt against the iron-fisted Porfirio Díaz emerged from many corners of Mexico as
the diverse population of Mexico began to grow restless. The series of conflicts which
made up the Mexican Revolution between rival groups within Mexico left the dynamics
of the Revolution in constant flux as various factions gained the upper hand on one
another and leaders began to emerge from the rubble. Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa
were two leading figures who became synonymous with the Mexican Revolution. Zapata
was a small landowner and a horse trainer who was angered by his repeated disputes with
Mexican courts concerning the inequities of Díaz’s land reforms.26 Pancho Villa, another
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of the revolutionaries made famous through his actions in the Revolution, also fought for
land reform.27 These noteworthy revolutionaries fought against government troops for
social reform; however, it was only when the power vacuum was filled when a new
President took control of Mexico that the Mexican Revolution finally began to abate.
Zapata and Villa, though legendary, were not the ones to assume the position of power
after the bloody Revolution subsided.
The Revolution and the associated political chaos was steadied to a large extent
when Plutarch Elías Calles became President in 1924.28 Calles ruled until 1928, and in his
time as President created the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) which initiated the
contemporary Mexican political system. The PRM provided a stable national party,
eventually renamed the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), as it remains known
today.29 Despite the relative calm reached when Calles became President at the end of the
Mexican Revolution, deep divisions remained evident in Mexican society, reflecting a
still, though less than before, volatile state.
PRI
The PRI, especially during Lazaro Cárdenas reign as President from 1934-1940,
began a remodeling of the Mexican state similar to the Porifrio Díaz years. Land reform
in the countryside, along with paved roads and farm mechanization, meant increased
productivity in agriculture and also higher quality of life for peasants.30 Schools and
medical facilities were improved which combined to bring longer life expectancies.31
Labour gradually became organized, and salaries and working conditions improved to a
modest degree.32 The Mexican economy was also buoyed by the discovery and
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production of oil and minerals. Each became Mexican export staples. From 1940-1970
Mexico’s GNP increased six percent annually, one of the highest rates in the world.33 The
economic boom Mexico was experiencing supported the improvement of roads and other
infrastructure, including tourism, which lent to the foreign perceptions of Mexico as a
happy, stable, and prosperous country.34 This façade of happiness and opportunity
shielded the outside world from the less savory realities of Mexico during this era of
social and economic reform.
Stark disparities in wealth saw the majority of wealth go to elites, while most
Mexicans languished in extreme poverty. The privileged members of Mexico’s wealthiest
20 percent earned 60 percent of the national income in 1950 and, by 1969, that number
increased to 64 percent. On the other hand, the poorest half of Mexico earned a mere 19
percent of the national income in 1950, which spoke to the severe discrepancies within
Mexican society.35 The inequities of Mexican society during the post revolution era also
manifested themselves in the lack of democratic principles in Mexico. The electoral
system was corrupted to such an extent that PRI candidates were assured victory, no
matter the candidates put forth by rival parties.36 The PRI guaranteed its power by
suppressing strikes and civil movements to maintain the status quo.37 Strike movements
and civil unrest were commonplace as varied groups, such as doctors, rail workers, and
teachers, rose up to protest the inequities inherent within Mexican society and the
government.38 The processes of civil unrest, inequality and flux have characterized
Mexican society from its Mesoamerican origins up until the Mexico City massacre. This
overview, while not extensive, provides context for the emergence of the student
movement and the social unrest leading up to the 1968 Olympic Games.
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The Mexican Student Movement
The Mexican student movement blossomed from an innocuous clash between
rival student groups in late July 1968.39 Seemingly to highlight the politically-charged
environment present during 1968 around the globe, Mexican students from many
universities marched to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Cuba’s revolution which had
installed a communist regime. Students from Vocational School Number Two of the
National Polytechnical Institute and those of the Preparatory School Isaac Ochoterena
clashed in the streets.40 The Mexican riot police who responded to the small scuffles
between the two student groups used grossly excessive force to suppress the students
involved. Students were cleared by police clubs which battered and bloodied many of
them. The police continued to pursue the students back to their schools and, in one
circumstance, a door was torn off its hinges by a bazooka.41 The use of extreme force by
the Mexican police in this instance was alarming and had severe consequences.
The police brutality seemed to instill a sense of solidarity amongst Mexican
students in general. In the days and weeks following the police heavy-handedness,
students began to organize into groups which marched in the streets voicing displeasure
at not only the violent and oppressive police force, but also against the inequities of
Mexican society, namely an unjust legal system and government.42 Historians Keith and
Claire Brewster have posited that the student movement, though catalyzed by this police
brutality, was not the sole reason for the Mexican student movement’s organization.
Rather, the Mexican student movement was merely a reaction to societal inequities
through protest movements over the years, though police brutality served as its flash
point.43 These prior protest movements in Mexico included the teachers’ strike of April
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1958 which was supported by other groups, such as students from the UNAM and the
Poli, electrical, oil, and railway workers.44 During 1958 and 1959, railway workers went
on strike, and were in turn supported by electricians and oil workers.45 In both instances,
the protest movements were based upon income inequities and lack of workers’ rights. In
each instance, the movements gained support from other segments of society. In any case,
it is fair to conclude that societal unrest was the product of an unequal society where
wealth was enjoyed by few and the majority suffered in poverty. This inequity was the
underlying reason that the Mexican student movement began. It also seems that the police
brutality in handling the skirmish between rival student groups in late July 1968 served as
the impetus for simmering civil unrest to boil over and, thereby, inspiring a consolidated
protest movement.
Angered by the injustice served upon them by the police, Mexican students
quickly organized into a protest movement a few short days after the initial police
brutality. The student movement ran the gamut of Mexican society. It included students
with radical political beliefs, those with moderate political leanings, and those who did
not want to miss out on the opportunity to be with friends and avoid school.46 Four days
after the incendiary incident, on 26 July, a large student march was met with more police
clubs and guns. Many students were injured during these clashes and four were killed in
the police assault on the students.47 The rough handling of this student march further
entrenched the desire of students to protest against the police and the government. In
response to this second example of police brutality in quick succession the students
issued six demands to the Mexican government:
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1. Repeal of Articles 145 and 145b of the Penal Code. (These sanctioned the
imprisonment of anyone who attended meetings of three or more people, who
were deemed to threaten public order.)
2. The abolition of the riot police.
3. Freedom of political prisoners.
4. Compensation given to those injured during disturbances.
5. The identification of officials responsible for bloodshed.
6. The dismissal of the chief of police, Luis Cueto; his deputy, Raul Mendiolea; and
General A. Frias, commander of the riot police.48
The government, aware of the threat a student movement might pose to its power
and to the upcoming Olympic Games they had invested in so heavily, began to strategize
its response to the movement. The Mexican government’s early strategy to deal with the
student movement was to allow it to continue largely unchecked while actively trying to
plant dissidents within the movement to weaken it. This plan to weaken the students by
subterfuge reflected the government’s hope that by letting the students go relatively
unchecked, the enthusiasm for the movement would decrease and it would organically
decompose.49 The government did, however, utilize the state-sponsored media to
undermine and ostracize the student movement. Full page advertisements in newspapers
appeared which linked the student movement to communism in an attempt to make the
movement seem radical and dangerous.50 The police strategically arrested some student
leaders, owing to the fact most of those arrested were foreigners and much older than
student age. This added weight to the allegations of the peripheral nature of the student
movement within Mexican society.51
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The student movement continued to gain momentum and, in response to the
government’s attack campaign, fully-fledged ideas about the expansion of democracy,
university reform, and poverty reduction were advanced by the students.52 In fact, for the
first time the Olympic Games were drawn into the Mexican student movement as a 30
July demonstration featured a banner which proclaimed, “We don’t want the
Olympics.”53
The student movement remained prominent within Mexican society because of
the large rallies and demonstrations regularly held. Some 200,000 students protested
against the government on 13 August, and, 14 days later, on 27 August, another 300,000
marched to show their displeasure with Mexican society and the ruling government.54 In
the latter instance, a consequential precedent was set when the police and army were
dispatched by the government to remove the student demonstrators.55 The students’
discontent continued into September. On the 13th of September a march of thousands of
students congested Mexico City’s streets. Though a notable continuation of the student’s
prominent displays of unhappiness with the government, more disturbing altercations
between the students and the government followed shortly thereafter. On 18 September,
unconfirmed numbers of students were killed after a ferocious altercation with the
military at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM). The military
subsequently invaded and occupied part of the UNAM campus. The striking
aggressiveness of the military response to the students seemed to create a lull in the
student movement’s proceedings as the rest of September passed by without major
incidents.56 The calm of late September was thrown into disarray on 2 October in
Tlatelolco.
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The Mexican student movement, though diverse and fluid, remained grounded in
discontent towards the Mexican authorities whose gruff handling of a minor altercation
was a precipitating factor among once loosely organized groups that became a solidified
student movement. Though never clearly articulated, the student movement remained,
from start to finish, incensed by police brutality, social inequality, and a lack of
democracy in Mexico. These students strove, by way of public demonstrations, to bring
about progressive changes to Mexican society.
The Political History of the Olympics
Since the first third of the 20th century, the modern Olympic Games represent the
pinnacle of athletic performance in international sport.57 Despite this lofty current status
of the Olympic Games as the pre-eminent site for athletic excellence, the Olympic Games
have faced numerous controversies and conundrums from its origin in 1896. Beset by
financial difficulties, the early Olympic festivals struggled for survival owing to lack of
financial support and public interest.58 In fact, the early Olympic Games, until the 1920s,
were affixed onto the much more well-established and celebrated World Fairs and
Expositions which had a long history of popularity.59 The Olympic Games, still shackled
with financial insecurity, consolidated itself as the highest form of sporting excellence
through shrewd use of ancient Greek imagery, altruistic aims and ideals, an organized
and hierarchical decision-making body (the IOC), and the technological advances which
helped to popularize the Games.60
Once established as the pre-eminent venue for international sport, the Olympics
became increasingly a site of political and ideological contestation. Historian Richard
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Espy aptly noted, “The Olympic Games system is both actor and stage… a stage upon
which world political forces are displayed in competition.”61 Countries around the world
began to utilize the stage the Olympics provided to portray positive images of their
nations to global audiences.62 The examples of countries using the Games in a political
manner are numerous. The 1936 Olympics in Berlin, for example, were utilized by Adolf
Hitler and the Nazis to broadcast an image of Germany as an efficient, friendly, and nonoppressive society to the international community.63 The propaganda sanitized the less
savory aspects of National Socialism in favour of projecting a fabricated and positive
image to the world.
Political manifestations of the Olympic Games reached higher levels in the years
after the Soviet Union entered the Olympic movement in 1952. The Soviets, since the
Russian revolution, had stayed on the sidelines with respect to the Olympic Games. The
Soviet hierarchy derided the IOC and the Games as a bourgeois sports phenomena.
Owing to the western dominance of the Olympic Games, the Soviets feared the Games
had the potential to lead Soviet citizens away from their state-sponsored class struggles
and workers ideals.64 After careful examination of the international sports landscape,
which included sending Soviet athletes to watch the 1948 London Olympics, the Soviets
decided the time was ripe for their first foray into the Olympic Games as the Soviet
Union.65
Soviet re-entry into the Olympic Games coincided with the beginning of the Cold
War. Owing to the symbolic importance of the Olympics in international sport, the two
main adversaries during the Cold War, the Americans and Soviets, both followed by their
western and eastern bloc allies, used sport as a way to demonstrate the superiority of their
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societies. Cold War tensions played out in dramatic fashion at the 1956 Melbourne
Olympics. The water-polo match at the Melbourne Games between the Soviets and
Hungarian men’s teams featured highly physical and violent play. The violence of the
match mirrored the political dissension between the two countries in the wake of the
October 1956 Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolution against communist
governance.66 While the water-polo match was a tangible and prominent example of the
symbolic political importance the Olympics, it was more common that political uses of
the Olympics were less overt in character. Amongst other ways to achieve success in the
Games, winning medals was seen as exerting superiority over rival nations, and the
stakes were raised to realize this via doping practices and state-sponsored athletes.
Both the Soviets and Americans wanted to outdo one another to show strength
and social superiority. Upon the Soviets joining the Olympic movement in 1952, Avery
Brundage identified the importance of American athletes performing well against their
Soviet counterparts, “Since for the first time these games will provide a direct
comparison between our boys and girls and those from the Communist world, it is
essential that we send our best and strongest team.”67 Likewise, the Soviets were eager to
show up the west in the highest level of sport competition in the world. Nikolai
Romanov, Chairman of the government Committee on Physical Culture and Sport
recalled in his memoir, “Once we decided to take part in foreign competitions, we were
forced to guarantee victory, otherwise the “free” bourgeois press would fling mud at the
whole nation as well as our athletes.”68 The table was set, and the political ramifications
were laid in plain sight.
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Sport in Post-Revolutionary Mexico
Hosting the Olympic Games had been coveted by the Mexican government for
quite some time. The ability of the Olympic Games to provide a stage from which to
project a controlled and positive image of their country to the world piqued the interest of
the government.69 The Mexican government had bid unsuccessfully to host the 1956 and
1960 editions of the Games.70 The bidding to host the Olympic Games was the
culmination of a process in the post-revolutionary years where Mexico was attracted to
sport much more than previously.
The Mexican government interest in sport was a long established facet of
Mexican society. The 1926 Central American Games were hosted by Mexico as a way to
show the international community that the country had successfully emerged from the
Mexican revolution stronger than ever.71 Additionally, sporting policies were put in place
by the post-revolutionary Mexican governments which included physical education in
schools, the building of sport-specific facilities, and the organization of sporting bodies.72
However, in keeping with their history of inequity, sport in post-revolutionary Mexico
was the domain of the privileged few and was not enjoyed equally by the poor who did
not have the leisure time needed to participate in and watch sport.73 In addition to the
different experiences of sport between the elite and the poor, sporting inequities also
presented themselves on a racial basis. Sports in schools were positioned as an
opportunity to ‘civilize’ Indians and assimilate them into more acceptable ‘white’
behavior patterns.74
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The implementation of sporting programs, no matter how unequal these programs
were, led to increased participation and success among Mexican athletes in international
sporting events. In the 1932 Olympics, Mexico won its first Olympic medals.75 With its
increasing success and establishment within international sport, Mexico began to assume
a more prominent role. The Mexicans played a significant role in organizing the creation
of the Pan-American Games, hosting them in 1955.76 In post-revolution Mexico, the
government began to utilize sport strategically as a way of uniting or assimilating its
citizens while also trying to give the international community a positive impression of the
country. These uses of sport were punctuated by the crescendo of sport in postrevolutionary Mexico, the 1968 Olympic Games.
Mexico’s bid for the 1968 Olympics
Mexico City’s successful 1968 Olympic bid was largely due to the efforts of three
men who had political influence and equally yearned for an opportunity for Mexico to
have a chance to express itself on the global sporting stage. One of these men, President
Adolfo López Mateos, was an avid sportsman whose propensity towards sport was
evident through his involvement in his youth, as well as his physical education teaching
duties in a college in Toluca, near Mexico City.77 Adolfo López Mateos’ support for the
Olympic bid was a critical boost to its chances; in fact, it was essential to get the bid off
the ground. The other two men who were most instrumental to bringing the Olympics to
Mexico were both politically connected sportsmen, José de Jesús Clark Flores and Marte
R. Gómez. Gómez was elected to the IOC in 1934, while Flores became an IOC member
in 1952 and led the Mexican Olympic Committee from 1952-1965.78 Flores had
connections with high-ranking government officials that spanned decades and equally
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was seen to be one of IOC President Avery Brundage’s most loyal supporters, no doubt a
useful relationship when bidding for the Olympic Games.79 Gómez had a well-established
and successful personal history serving as a bridge between the national government and
Mexico’s sporting authorities.80 To have powerful political figures supporting the drive to
host the Olympics was by no means unique to Mexico; however, the support from these
politically-connected individuals was a driving factor in getting the Mexico City bid to a
level where it had a chance to be successful. IOC President Avery Brundage’s personal
affinity for Mexico City was another stroke of good fortune which lent to the increased
likelihood of Mexico City hosting an Olympics. As the head of the Mexico City
headquartered Pan-American Games Association, Brundage spent a great deal of time in
Mexico City, establishing personal connections and affinity towards the city.81
However despite these beneficial factors, equally influential in Mexico City’s
successful bid was the international political climate of the Cold War, a climate that
afflicted the chances of its bid city opponents in being awarded the Games. Buenos Aires,
Detroit, Lyon, and Mexico City’s hopes to host the 1968 Olympic Games descended
upon the 1963 IOC meeting in Baden-Baden, West Germany where a vote for the right to
host these Games was to be undertaken.82 The Detroit bid was hampered by infighting
amongst the USOC, whose members were not in complete agreement that Detroit was the
best American candidate city. In fact, Los Angeles was put forth as an alternative which
gained traction amongst some factions of the USOC.83 Apart from the internal bickering
amongst USOC members, another factor hurt the Detroit bid’s chances significantly. As a
city of the United States, the leading western bloc nation, awarding the Games to an
American city would displease eastern bloc nations. Lyon’s Olympic bid was also hurt by
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the western bloc association and the IOC’s concern of antagonizing eastern bloc
nations.84 Buenos Aires, though seen as a site external to Cold War concerns, was
discounted as a viable Olympic host owing to the recent military coup Argentina
experienced in 1962-1963. The IOC’s uncertainty as to the stability of Argentina’s
political situation, and associated security concerns effectively ruled Buenos Aires out of
the running to host the 1968 Games.85
Mexico City, in contrast to the other candidate cities, was looked upon
internationally as a Latin American success story, with economic prosperity and political
stability, and as an unaligned country during the Cold War.86 Though being seen as
having the qualities which rival bidders did not possess, political neutrality and political
stability, gave the Mexico City bid an advantage, the Mexico City bid team worked hard
to maximize its chances of hosting the Games. No opportunity to impress the IOC was
overlooked. The Mexicans went the extra mile to talk to anyone and everyone to extol the
virtues of their bid. No matter what political persuasion, the Mexicans were eager to gain
the support of everyone.87 The ways in which the Mexico City Olympics would benefit
the people of Mexico, particularly the youth, resonated with Soviet bloc nations that
viewed sport as a vehicle of the people and helped to guarantee eastern bloc support of
the Mexican bid.88 Even simple strategic decisions by the Mexican delegation benefitted
the chances of their bid being selected. The Mexicans put up their display in the BadenBaden convention center nearest the entrance, so that as each delegate entered the room,
the Mexican display would greet them first. Additionally, Mexican artifacts were placed
around the convention center, including a statue of the Aztec god Quetzlcoatl, which
pointed the way to the convention hall where the Mexican display greeted them.89 Both
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the international political climate and some shrewd proselytizing of the Mexican bid
combined to ensure victory.
The Mexico City Massacre
The hope of the Mexican government to utilize the Olympics as an opportunity to
show off their country as peaceful and prosperous took an enormous blow on 2 October
1968. The lead-up to the Olympics had already presented significant problems for the
Mexican leadership as concerns were raised over the inclusion of South Africa by the
IOC and the associated boycott movement of many countries and, notably, black
American athletes; the effects of the Mexico City altitude on the participating athletes;
and, the questionable ability of Mexico to host the Games given its status as a developing
nation.90 These possible pitfalls were, for the most part, overcome though some athletes
did boycott, such as Lew Alcindor. Further concerns lingered about the negative
consequences of hosting athletic contests at altitude. Nevertheless, preparations lunged
forward.91 With these threats mostly negated, the internal situation in Mexico, which had
been unstable for the summer and fall months owing to student demonstrations, burst into
flame under the watchful eye of Aztec, Spanish colonial, and modern Mexican buildings
in the Plaza of the Three Cultures.
Much is still unknown about the Tlatelolco massacre of 2 October 1968. The
numbers of those murdered and jailed are still unconfirmed, with figures ranging widely
from a few murdered to over 100. Many believe that thousands were thrown into jail by
Mexican authorities as a result of their involvement in the Mexican student movement.
However, these estimates remain debatable and unconfirmed. The generally accepted
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facts of the massacre, as described by sports historian Kevin Witherspoon, indicate that
government helicopters flew over the student demonstration in the Plaza de la Tres
Culturas at roughly 6:00 PM.92 The estimated 5,000 student protestors in the square had
held a carnival-like demonstration throughout that day.93 Minutes after the helicopters
flew over the square white-gloved security agents trained specifically for the Olympics,
the Olimpia Battalian, and regular police and army forces stormed the square and opened
fire on the crowd assembled. The shooting lasted for an hour before ceasing briefly and
then resuming until 11:00 PM.94
Apart from these facts presented by Kevin Witherspoon, numerous eye-witness
accounts of the massacre paint the event in a poignant manner. The widely disparate
recollections of the massacre highlight the frenetic mania which engulfed those
witnessing the event. Though the specifics of these recollections are very different, there
is commonality in the narratives. In the accounts given by eye-witnesses to the massacre,
the brutally repressive violence perpetrated by government forces is consistently
mentioned. The narrative of the massacre presented by the Mexican government,
however, bore the details out in a contradictory fashion to the accounts of eye-witnesses.
The Mexican government put forth a carefully manicured and self-serving
narrative explaining the events at Tlatelolco. In the weeks leading up to the massacre,
international journalists descended on Mexico City to begin their Olympic coverage in
earnest. The Mexican government confronted journalists and, as Jack Zenger, a New York
Times reporter, recollected, “an official told us: ‘There are no riots. If anyone asks you
about riots, say it’s not your department.’”95 The precedent was set for the government’s
eagerness to make the student problem disappear.
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In the aftermath of the massacre, however, the government was forced to confront
the issue given the attention the event garnered. The government was quick to attempt to
absolve itself from blame for starting the massacre and placed the blame for precipitating
the massacre onto the student movement. The government stated that the fighting started
when one group of students began firing at another, but then changed its story to plead
that students opened fire from a balcony lining the square.96 The narrative the
government put forward proved to be exceedingly malleable as it quickly began to
implicate foreign communists and the C.I.A. as ring-leaders in starting the violence and
inculcating innocent Mexicans with their dangerous ideologies.97 Additionally, the
government, following the example it set in the weeks preceding the massacre,
downplayed the significance of the massacre and claimed that very few were killed,
ranging from four to roughly a dozen. The government-controlled newspapers furthered
the narrative that few were killed in the violence, and television stations referred to the
event as a police incident.98
A sample of the front page headlines of major newspapers in Mexico City from 3
October was presented in Elena Poniatowska’s Massacre in Mexico to highlight the
reactions of the newspapers to the massacre. Excelsior’s headline was, “Serious fighting
as army breaks up meeting of strikers. 20 dead, 75 wounded, 400 jailed”; Novedades,
“Shots exchanged by sharpshooters and the army in Cuidad Tlatelolco. Figures thus far:
25 dead and 87 wounded”; El Universal, “Tlatelolco a battlefield. Serious fighting for
hours between terrorists and soldiers”; La Prensa, “Many killed and wounded according
to Garcia Barragan. Army and students exchange gunfire”; El Dia, “Criminal provocation
at Tlatelolco meeting causes terrible bloodshed. Fight with army at Tlatelolco results in
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many dead and wounded: General Hernandez Toledo and 12 other soldiers wounded.
One soldier dead. Number of civilians killed or wounded still not known”; El Heraldo,
“Bloody encounter in Tlatelolco. 26 dead and 71 wounded; sharpshooters fire on army
troops. General Toledo wounded”; El Sol de Mexico, “Foreign interlopers attempt to
damage Mexico’s national image. The objective: Preventing the nineteenth Olympic
Games from being held. Sharpshooters fire on army troops in Tlatelolco. On general and
11 soldiers wounded; 2 soldiers and more than 20 civilians killed in a terrible gun battle”;
El Nacional, “Army forced to rout sharpshooters: Garcia Barragan”; Ovaciones, “Bloody
gun battle in the Plaza de last res Culturas. Dozens of sharpshooters fire on troops. 23
dead, 52 wounded, 1000 arrested, and more vehicles burned”; La Aficion, “Student
meeting in Tlatelolco results in heavy gunfire.”99 The pervasiveness of the government
version of events within these newspapers is evident. This narrative implicates the
students as the agitators who caused the violence, thereby absolving the government from
blame for starting the violence.
In contrast with the government narrative, eye-witness accounts of the massacre
indicate government culpability in causing the violence. British journalist John Rodda of
the Guardian provided a first-hand account of the violence cited in Keith Brewster’s
edited volume titled, Reflections on Mexico ’68. Rodda arrived at the Plaza de la Tres
Culturas shortly before 5:00 PM on 2 October. He subsequently entered the main balcony
where the student leaders were speaking to the excitable and enthusiastic crowd. Rodda
recalled, “By the time the first speaker began it was estimated that nearly 10,000 people
were packed into the square, which gave the operation a huge lift. One of the speakers
had just started delivering his message when a green Very light soared up behind the
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Foreign Office block; it caused immediate agitation in the square below and tension on
my balcony. My interpreter went white and said, ‘we must leave, it’s the military.’”100
With that, those on the balcony dropped to the floor in order to take cover from what they
assumed was an impending barrage of army fire. As Rodda began to ready himself to
take cover as well, he remarked, “As I turned there was a man in an open-neck shirt and
slacks with a white glove on his left hand and a gun in the other that was pointing at
me.”101 At the sight of the gun Rodda dropped to the floor, joining those others on the
balcony who had already done so and he,
Had only been on the ground a few seconds it seemed, when the firing began. It
was so deafening that I could not immediately make out from where it came. But
from the cries and screams it was clearly having an effect in the crowded square
below. It lasted it seemed for minutes; then came a relative quiet before another
lead onslaught was unleashed.102
It was unclear to Rodda who the white-gloved man was. He originally assumed
that he must have been a student supporter and that they were under siege by the army.
As time passed, with Rodda still lying prone on the balcony, he,
Heard vehicles apparently trundling into the square; they seemed to have wheels
and tracks. They halted; someone started shooting and then came the crump of
bazooka or mortar fire, an explosion and several times the sound of fire burning.
They seemed to be picking off flats and open balconies, I surmised, and this
confirmed there were two parties involved in combat.103
After approximately an hour and a half since the shooting began, a brief respite of silence
prevailed. Rodda eventually made his way from the balcony and as he did so, “I now
realised [the men around me] were not students.”104 After starting to comprehend the
events which he had been involved in, Rodda stated he, “now realised that these men
were military.” As to the white-gloved men Rodda had come to realize that these men
were, “plain clothed militia.”105
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John Rodda’s harrowing experience in Tlatelolco corroborates with
Witherspoon’s account of the massacre. Elena Poniatowska conducted numerous
interviews with eye-witnesses and relatives of those murdered in the massacre. The result
of her investigation is an in-depth account of those Mexican students and civilians who
bore the brunt of an angry government.106 Poniatowska states that, “all witnesses agree”
that flares and a helicopter over the square signaled the start of the shooting by Mexican
government forces after a day of peaceful demonstrations by the students.107 The white
gloved identification worn by special police forces was also confirmed by the majority of
Poniatowska’s witnesses.108 Estrella Sámano, a student, recounted, “They started firing
from the helicopter, and I began to hear rifle reports overhead.”109 As the violence
escalated, the sensationalism of the event was evident to those in the square. Elvira B. de
Concheiro, described by Poniatowska as a mother of a family, recalled, “I was so
dumfounded I said to myself, I can’t believe it- it’s like in a movie! I’ve never seen
anything like this except in the movies. Those just can’t be real bullets!”110
Chaos was palpable as the government forces infiltrated the square from two sides
and opened fire which led Margarita Nolasco, an anthropologist who was hiding behind a
pillar in the square, to state, “A whole great crowd was running first in one direction and
then another: they’d run away and then head back our way again, and more of them
would fall on the ground. I thought they should all have sense enough to keep away from
the men who were shooting at them, but they kept coming back. I found out later that
they were also being shot at from the other side of the Plaza.”111 The plaza was becoming
ever more a site of casualties, as Francisco Correa, a professor remembered, “There was
lots of blood underfoot, lots of blood smeared on the walls.”112 María Alicia Martínez
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Medrano, a nursery-school director explained, “We all started running again and just then
I spied a red Datsun with a young girl at the wheel. She’d been shot, and I saw her
collapse on top of the steering wheel; the horn kept blowing and blowing…”113 Diana
Salmerón de Contreras recalled that her little brother was hurt and she tried to get him
help in the square, “Please, somebody get him a stretcher! I’m right here, Julio…. a
stretcher! …. Soldier, a stretcher for somebody who’s been wounded… What’s the
matter, little brother?.... Answer me, little brother…. A stretcher!” As Diana began to
comprehend what was happening in the square now that she had her little brother with
her, she explained, “The very first thing I noticed was all the people lying on the ground;
the entire Plaza was covered with the bodies of the living and the dead, all lying side by
side. The second thing I noticed was that my kid brother had been riddled with
bullets.”114 Diana continued her pursuit of a stretcher for her brother when she asked,
“Soldier, please have somebody bring a stretcher!” The solider replied, “Shut up and stop
pestering me or you’ll be needing two of them.”115
The frenzied atmosphere in Tlatelolco seemed evident to all those in the square.
Mary McCallen, a press photographer, recounted, “Everything was a blur- I don’t know if
it was because I was crying or because it had started to rain. I watched the massacre
through this curtain of rain, but everything was fuzzy and blurred.”116 Brutality on behalf
of the army and police, however, seemed to shine through the blurred and manic
recollections of those present. Ignacio Galván, a student at the San Carlos Academy and
the Ciudadela Ceramics Workshop, called to mind his experiences in Tlatelolco. He
recalled his encounter with a soldier, “Why are you beating me, since I’ve already
showed you my student-body card?” “That’s exactly the reason I’m beating you, you
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little bastard” was the answer. I admit I was scared, because I’d never been beaten like
that in my life.” Ignacio Galván then remembered soldiers remarking to one another, “If
any of these kids gives you any trouble, mow him down.”117 Ignacio’s brother, Carlos
Galván, a student at UNAM’s School of Library Sciences, confirmed the brutality of
which his brother spoke. Carlos Galván stated, “They made us line up with our hands up,
and took the ones with long hair aside. They made one kid kneel down and lopped his
hair off with a bayonet. I thought they were going to cut my brother Ignacio’s hair offhe’s an artist and wears it very long. Then they told us to line up with the rest of the kids.
‘Here’s a little farewell present for you.’ And they started hitting us as though they were
breaking piñatas.”118
Taken together, the accounts presented by John Rodda, the interviews highlighted
by Elena Poniatowska, and Kevin Witherspoon’s analysis in Before the Eyes of the World
contradict the reports of the massacre which emanated from the Mexican government.
The eye-witness accounts presented agree on the chaos and brutality that came with the
government forces incursion into the Plaza de la Tres Culturas. These two competing
narratives of the massacre were presented in the Canadian and American media.
The course of Mexican history, riddled with inequities and civil unrest, provided
an atmosphere ripe for demonstrations and protest movements against the often
discriminatory Mexican governments. The 1968 Olympic Games provided a venue for
the inequities of Mexican society to be on prominent display as resources were funneled
into Olympic infrastructure to project images of a sophisticated, developed country while
the majority of the population wallowed in extreme poverty. Sport in post-revolutionary
Mexico, also unequally distributed and enjoyed across different segments of Mexican
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society, was wielded as an exploitive tool by the Mexican government to satisfy
numerous needs. The government used sport to both appear advanced and civilized to the
international community, and also to help normalize marginalized portions of Mexican
society into behavior patterns deemed acceptable by the government.
The Olympic Games, as the supreme site for political machinations in
international sport, became the venue desired for the Mexican government to show the
global community, and its citizens, just how great Mexico was. The convergence of
inequities in Mexican society, and the discontent at these inequities expressed by the
student movement, together with the government’s desire to host a perfect Olympic
Games brought disastrous consequences. Undoubtedly, the devastation of the Mexico
City massacre was influenced by the impending Olympic Games which the Mexican
government had placed great importance on.
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Chapter 3: American Newspapers and Tlatelolco
The newspaper accounts of the New York Times and Washington Post regarding
the Mexico City massacre during October 1968 were numerous, diverse, and eclectic.
The coverage of both newspapers was laced with meaning structures revealing the
political tendencies of the authors. Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding paradigm for
analyzing these newspaper reports provided an in-depth method of analysis of the
meaning structures within the massacre coverage and the power effects that these
meaning structures had on furthering certain narratives while marginalizing others.1
These political tendencies were decoded by readers in the form of “letters to the editor”
which often opposed the viewpoints published. This factor indicates that the newspaper
reporting was critically analyzed by the audience. The reporting of Tlatelolco in these
newspapers interestingly mirrored the diverse and complicated American relationship
with Mexico and America’s political positioning in the Cold War, whereby the threat of
communism was vilified. The Times and the Post both provided their readers with indepth reporting which spoke to the long-standing relationship between America and
Mexico. Additionally, balanced coverage was a characteristic of reporting, as was a
degree of awareness of the danger the massacre presented to those attending the Games.
Context
The United States and Mexico have experienced a close, troubled, and undeniably
intertwined historical relationship. A state of conflict prevailed between the two countries
for the majority of the nineteenth century and during the Mexican revolution which
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started in 1910.2 Tempestuous relations between America and Mexico since Mexican
independence from Spain in 1821 to the end of the French military intervention in
Mexico in 1867 were the product of a multitude of factors.3 Chief amongst these factors
was American ambition to expand its physical boundaries as well as its political influence
and the consistent political upheaval in Mexican society. Designs of expansionism on the
part of the United States led to meddling in Mexican society. The goal of this intervention
into Mexican society was to make Mexico more American-friendly. The instability
within Mexican society manifested itself in the many wars, government changes, and
civil unrest during the 19th century, making stable and consistent relations with America
nearly impossible. Both the American expansionism and the instability of Mexico
naturally led to discord in relations between the two nations.
Relations were strained when United States expansionism reared its head toward
Mexico during the secession of Texas from Mexico in 1836. Mexico had permitted
American homesteaders to settle in its sparsely populated northern territory of Texas. The
settlers accepted the Mexican citizenship which came with this settlement opportunity,
but soon became dissatisfied with Mexican governance. In 1836, the settlers unilaterally
declared their independence.4 The United States opportunistically capitalized on the
settlers’ revolt by sending in American armed forces to aid the separatist’s struggle with
Mexico. What began as a movement for independence on the part of the settlers
eventually became an annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845. America
declared war on Mexico in 1846 stating that it was defending its national territory, newly
acquired Texas. In a matter of months, the U.S. army conquered Mexico City.5 In 1848,
the war between the two countries was formally concluded with the Treaty of Guadalupe-
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Hidalgo. In the Treaty, Mexico was coerced into ceding half its territory to the
Americans.6 American expansion westward was assured with its amalgamation of
territory from Mexico. The seeds of Mexican distrust and suspicion towards the United
States were sewn in the aftermath of this conflict and also sentiments of Mexican
nationalism were ignited.7
Vastly improved relations between the two countries occurred when the Mexican
government was overhauled and Porfirio Díaz became President. During Porfirio Díaz’s
presidency from 1877-1911, U.S.-Mexican relations became focused on bilateral
agreements which were mutually beneficial. U.S. companies invested heavily in Mexican
railroads and mining which in turn improved Mexican infrastructure while helping to
stimulate the American economy. In 1883, a trade reciprocity treaty was signed, which
decreased tariffs and legal barriers and invigorated trade between the two countries.8
Total trade between Mexico and the United States increased steadily from nine million
pesos in 1870 to 117 million pesos in 1910, indicating the impact of the signed
agreements. Further exemplifying the growing relationship between the two countries,
1911 became the year American foreign investment in Mexico exceeded that of Great
Britain. In 1911 the British still enjoyed a seafaring empire where the sun never set, and
as a result their global presence was still unrivaled in 1911. Mexico thus became the first
nation in Latin America to hold the distinction of having more American than British
investment in Mexico, indicating the strengthening of the American-Mexican
relationship.9 Despite the increased trade relationship of the Americophile Díaz
government, the American infiltration of Mexican life became more obtuse once Díaz
was overthrown and revolution occurred.
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American interference and intervention in Mexico continued in a more subversive
manner after the Díaz’s departure during the Mexican Revolution which began in 1910.
The intrusion of the U.S. in internal Mexican politics was evident when President
Woodrow Wilson ordered American troops to invade Mexico’s principal port of
Veracruz in 1914 to prevent a large arms convoy from reaching the army of General
Victoriano Huerta. This intervention enabled the American-backed army of Huerta’s
rival, Venustiano Carranza, to seize Veracruz, tipping the balance of the Revolution to
suit American interests.10 With their expansionist dreams for Central America, it
followed that the United States would try to shape the Mexican Revolution.11 Francisco
Madero, who was President of Mexico during the Revolution from 1911-1913, enjoyed
American support because of his pro-U.S. policies.12 When Madero was overthrown and
Victoriano Huerta became President, Woodrow Wilson did not readily recognize the
Huerta government owing to its military and authoritarian overtones.13 Huerta’s
unfavourable policies towards the U.S. led the Wilson administration to advance money
to his rival, Carranza. Wilson inserted 12,000 American soldiers and marines into
Veracruz, which the Americans had helped Carranza control, and threatened to move
them by rail into Mexico City if Huerta refused to resign.14 Huerta, after some
consternation, conceded to the American request and resigned on 15 July 1914. The
United States claimed victory.15 The impacts of American interference into Mexico were
substantial, bringing about regime change and altering the course of the Mexican
Revolution. With this involvement came resentment from factions of Mexican society
who opposed American intervention. The American-Mexican relationship, however, was
due for another orientation shift.
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The Second World War had a profound impact on the American-Mexican
relationship and went some way towards changing its dynamics. The United States and
Mexico embarked on mutually beneficial endeavors to aid the Allied war effort. Mexico
joined the Allied cause and provided migratory workers to the United States during the
war years.16 Additionally, during the Second World War Mexico began to expropriate its
oil to America, which stimulated the Mexican economy.17 The United States also granted
Mexico more license to enact sovereign policies even if they were unfavourable to the
U.S., as exemplified by their refusal to allow American troops to build a U.S. military
base in Mexico.18 During the war years, increasing bilateral cooperation in military and
economic matters emerged. In 1942, an agreement to lower trade barriers between the
countries was put into effect, which helped Mexico gain from the new American market
for its oil.19 Further mutually beneficial agreements between the two nations allowed:
U.S. loans to steady Mexican public finances; development of Mexico’s communications;
and the easing immigration between the countries. In fact, the series of immigration
agreements, known as the Bracero Agreements enacted from 1942-1964, facilitated the
employment of approximately 300,000 Mexican workers during the war years in the
agricultural and rail industries of the United States. When these immigration agreements
were ended in 1964, roughly 4.5 million Mexicans had worked in America under the
Bracero Agreements.20
From the 1940s onward, the U.S. became the chief export market and primary
source of financing for Mexico. America benefitted in kind as Mexico became a major
destination for economic expansion as well as an investment haven and a primary nation
to export goods and services. Cheap Mexican labour and Mexico’s raw materials also
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stoked the American economy.21 Illustrating the close linkages built between the two
countries, in 1970 Mexican exports to the United States totaled 880 million dollars,
accounting for 68.2 percent of all Mexican exports. In 1970, Mexican imports from the
U.S. were 1,567 million dollars worth and 63.6 percent of Mexico’s total imports.22
Underscoring the close economic relationship between the two neighbours was
United States foreign policy. Since the Second World War, American foreign policy
focused upon the containment of communism which the U.S. believed was a threat to
peace and security.23 Owing to this preoccupation of containing communism, American
interests in Latin America were to ensure their southern flank was non-communist,
peaceful, and secure.24 In spite of the U.S. hopes for a secure Latin America and growing
economic linkages to the region, high levels of American engagement in Latin American
issues were not as prevalent as with other regions, namely Asia and Europe. In the late
1940s, U.S. policy regarding Latin America was enacted by a select handful of officials
and influential outsiders.25 Public polling in America contained few questions regarding
Latin America, making the public opinion of Americans concerning Latin America
difficult to assess. Additionally, in the 1940s and 1950s, few U.S. universities offered
Latin American studies, and even fewer students studied this subject. In the middle of the
20th century only the New York Times had a full-time staff correspondent in Latin
America, which resulted in few stories about the region.26 While the relationship was
vital and dynamic, room for growth existed.
The relationship between the United States and Mexico has endured many twists
and turns throughout the duration of its history. Friction was commonplace, with
agitation often arising from American intervention into Mexican life and the seeming
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instability in Mexican society. Though problems have arisen, opportunity and benefits
have been garnered by both countries, economically and politically. The influence of
Mexico’s proximity to the United States has been the major factor in the relationship
between the two countries.27 To exemplify the unusual relationship, liberal Mexican
politicians admired American institutions as examples of modernity which they wished to
employ in Mexico on one hand but, on the other, direct and indirect American
participation in Mexico’s political struggles created a sense of distrust amongst many
Mexicans.28
American meddling and concern over Mexico’s instability was evident during the
Mexican student movement of 1968. The American obsession to abolish communism as a
threat to the country exhibited itself through the U.S. State Department’s surveillance of
communism in Mexico.29 Given the leftist tendencies of other student movements of
1968, notably in France, the State Department became apoplectic with fear that
communism was central to the growing Mexican student movement.30 These concerns,
unfounded given the peripheral communist influence to this student movement,
correlated with Mexican government fear that communism ran rampant within the
student movement. To exemplify how entrenched and knowledgeable the U.S. State
Department was about the student movement, and the culminating massacre, a state
official report stated, “Students did not start [the] violence at Tlatelolco, but rather [a]
well-armed group identifying [them]selves by gloved left hand[s] started firing and
provided pretext for army firing.”31 Such was the understanding of the internal dynamics
of Mexico by their concerned American neighbours.
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The Mexican government frequently blamed communists for the growing student
movement and eventually U.S. officials came to realize the negligible communist tint to
the Mexican student movement. American worries then shifted towards the possibility
that the student movement might move the Mexican government towards the left of the
political spectrum as an appeasement tactic to remedy the student agitation.32 As
Mexico’s student movement persisted into the fall of 1968, U.S. officials began to
express their dismay at the potentially detrimental effects of the student unrest on the
Mexico City Olympic Games. These officials worried that Díaz Ordaz and the Mexican
hierarchy were ill-suited to subdue the student movement and respond to potential flareups given its inability to contain the earlier unrest in addition to their misjudgment of the
communist influence within the movement.33 In September 1968, President Díaz Ordaz
began preparing for what he viewed as inevitable armed conflict between the government
and the disaffected students. Mexico appealed for radios, riot gear, and heavy weapons
from the U.S.. This request was duly granted.34 This episode epitomized the close but
uneasy relations between the U.S. and Mexico. On one hand, the Americans did not trust
the Mexican government’s ability to handle the student unrest, while on the other the
U.S. exported goods to Mexico thereby mutually benefitting each country.
Findings
The Mexico City massacre stimulated substantial consideration by the New York
Times and the Washington Post in October 1968. Coverage of the massacre and its
possible ramifications were especially prevalent in the days immediately succeeding the
massacre. The massacre maintained a fairly prominent position in both newspapers
throughout the latter stages of the month of October, indicated by a number of front page
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articles and multiple articles within the same day’s paper. The reporting on Tlatelolco by
both the Times and the Post was characterized by numerous themes which punctuated
their coverage of the massacre. First, the massacre was reported in a manner which
supported each side. The representation of both the government narrative: that the
students instigated and were responsible for the violence, and the student narrative: that
the government brutally repressed their peaceful demonstration, were afforded balanced
depiction. Second, the massacre was not treated in isolation, but rather knowledgeable
and in-depth analysis of the precipitating causes of the massacre and the wider social
unrest in Mexico was engrained in the reports. Third, and finally, the coverage of the
massacre showed concern for, and highlighted, the perils for those attending the
Olympics in the wake of the violence.
Balanced Reporting35
The New York Times and Washington Post displayed a level of neutrality in their
reporting of the massacre. This was especially so concerning the assessment of blame for
starting the violence. Opinions were put forth, to be sure, but these opinions were
balanced by opposing beliefs presented in other articles lending to an overall body of
nonpartisan reporting. The government narrative, that the students were to blame for
causing the massacre, and the student narrative, that the government was blameworthy
were both afforded significant representation in both newspapers in October 1968.
Newspaper reports on where the blame rested for the massacre were contradictory.
Furthermore, “letters to the editors” from readers of the Times and Post often disputed the
coverage or interpretation put forth. The reporting style of these newspapers, providing
an even-keeled assessment while carefully not accepting either as factually certain, in
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many ways reflected the American-Mexican political relationship. Considerable
American business and economic interests in Mexico dictated that internal unrest in
Mexican society had implications for some Americans, thereby making a connection
between the massacre and content which impacted American citizens. Also, the political
relations between the two countries had a sordid past, and American skepticism towards
Mexico’s government was likely founded on past American dealings with Mexico.
The New York Times, on 3 October, was adorned with the front page headline,
“At Least 20 Dead as Mexico Strife Reaches a Peak. Troops Fire Machine Guns and
Rifles at Students- More than 100 Hurt.” The article, written by the Times columnist Paul
L. Montgomery, stated that, “Federal troops fired on a student rally with rifles and
machine guns tonight.”36 The article’s headline, and some of the content, endorsed the
student version that the government began firing on their demonstration and was thereby
responsible for the bloodshed. The thrust of the article’s beginning assessed fault towards
the Mexican government and Montgomery supported the student position in the article:
“In a statement tonight, the Defense Minister, Gen. Marcelino García Barragán, said that
the troops had moved on the rally after snipers fired on the Federal District riot police
guarding the nearby Foreign Ministry and a vocational school. The general’s statement
was disputed by many witnesses.”37 One witness was quoted as further indicting the
government by saying, “They came without warning. There was no tear gas. They just
shot at everyone.” Though the government was afforded representation in this article,
Montgomery’s stipulation that Barragán’s statements were disputed by many witnesses
served to undermine the credibility of the government. Implicit within the report was that
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the students were the victims in Tlatelolco, attacked by government troops and, even
though the government said otherwise, its views likely did not constitute reality.
The Washington Post, on 4 October, also featured a relatively equitable
assessment of the massacre. One of that day’s articles about the massacre was titled,
“Olympics Chief Says Games Will Be Held, Olympics are going ahead despite Mexican
violence.” The story provided its readers with the recap of the massacre as, “last night’s
battle between army troops and students” and that “rioting has shaken Mexico City since
mid-July when students struck in protest against government police.”38 The story
continued by stating, “Fire (was) laid down by the army against the snipers in the
crowded Plaza of three Cultures” and that “The army says that some 2000 troops rushed
into the Plaza after the riot police called for help. The police said snipers were shooting at
them.”39 These statements provided the government view of the events at Tlatelolco.
Despite the pervasiveness of the government narrative in the Post article, voice
was given to the students and a counter narrative to the dominant discourse was provided.
The story stated, “Gen. Marcelino García Barragán, the Defense Minister, blamed the
students for causing the tragedy. But some observers wondered if perhaps the military
had not overreacted with excessive force.”40 Raising the possibility that the military had
overreacted served to inform readers that the government was not completely absolved
from criticism, though the government’s version of the events was dominant in the
article. In fact, the Washington Post’s coverage of the massacre throughout October was
highlighted by its general endorsement of the government position; however, there was a
significant minority representation of the student version of events, demonstrating some
balance.
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The Washington Post on 4 October featured another article which directed fault
for the massacre toward the students. The story quoted Per Stroemboeck, chief of the
Swedish delegation, as stating, “When the students start demonstrations during the
opening ceremonies it could be extremely dangerous for our athletes.”41 Stroemboeck
presupposed that the students would cause trouble in the Olympic opening ceremonies
which implied that the students were the agitators responsible for the violence which had
just occurred. The title of the article, “Riots by Students Worry Olympians,” further
confirmed the article’s stance that the students caused the outbreak of violence at
Tlatelolco by labelling the violence as a student riot. The condemnation of the students
was continued on 5 October when the Post published an article about a Mexican sniper
titled, “Sniper Fire Breaks Mexico City Calm: Mexico City Sniper Fire Wounds Two.”
The story described a sniper who reignited violence in Mexico City after two days of
quiet since Tlatelolco, “Today’s sniping ended a period of quiet after two days of
shooting, burning, and fighting between troops and police and students protesting alleged
government repression.”42 Implicitly, the article questioned the validity of the students’
protests, by describing their concerns as “alleged” and therefore not necessarily true. The
battle narrative which emanated from the government, to make their use of force seem
justified, was also evident in this article. However, seemingly to counterbalance this
report, and the growing endorsement of the Mexican government narrative, was an
editorial titled “Night of Sorrow,” which provided a contrasting view of the massacre.
The Post stated, “It is reported that more than 500 civilians were wounded and more than
two score were killed in an outburst of rifle and machine gun fire at what seemed a
peaceful student rally.”43 This characterization called into question some of the
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previously published reports in the Post which derided the student snipers who
necessitated the outbreak of violence. This editorial continued by claiming, “As to the
origins and responsibility for this tragedy, we do not yet know enough to comment,”
raising the question of why the newspaper had already featured so many articles which
laid the blame towards the students.44
“Whatever the long-term effects on Mexico of this week’s violence, it
superficially has set back the students who started the agitation two months ago,” stated
Lewis H. Diguid of the Washington Post on 6 October. Diguid’s column stigmatized the
students as agitators who disturbed the peace and also created the battle at Tlatelolco.45
The Post continued on 6 October, as another story claimed, “A relative calm settled over
downtown Mexico City, in what the Army believes is the end of the current round of
student unrest.”46 The violence was portrayed as a student problem because it was
“student unrest,” thereby reinforcing the entrenchment of the narrative favouring the
Mexican government.
The Post’s endorsement of the Mexican government continued even as the story
changed and evolved. The implication, not only that students started the massacre, but
that the student movement had communist and foreign elements rose to prominence in
the days after the initial reporting of the massacre. On 7 October, coverage began with
the article titled, “Foreigners Cited in Mexico Violence,” by Lewis H. Diuguid. The
government’s insistence that foreigners and communists were influencing the Mexican
student movement was backed up by the Post: “widely respected former President Lazaro
Cárdenas,” went on to claim that, “foreign elements” were involved with the latest
violence in Tlatelolco.47 The Post gave authority and legitimacy to the sentiments in the
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article by remarking on Cárdenas’s respectability, giving credence to his opinion on the
matter.
On 11 October another example of the Post’s support of the government was
provided in Shirley Povich’s article, “This Morning.” The article described the violence
as “student rioting” and expressed the desire of Mexico to showcase itself internationally
in spite of the “recent student rioting.”48 The journalist explicitly accepted the
government’s version of the initiation of violence. The government-favoured reporting
however was counter-balanced by articles which questioned the government’s
involvement in the massacre and implied that it had perhaps over-reacted to the student
unrest.
The 13 October issue of the Post featured Lewis Diuguid’s “Mexico Opens the
Olympics without incident” article, suggesting that within Mexico it was uncertain as to
the nature of future protests. He stated, “Many here believe that divisive issues will rise
again after the Games. Opinion is split on whether the source of disquiet will be the
students or the factions within the government that have used the student movement for
their own political ends.”49 Evidently some had suggested that the government
manipulated the student unrest to achieve its own ends.
Morris Rosenberg of the Washington Post restated Diuguid’s presentation of two
narratives to explain what occurred at Tlatelolco and the potential future direction of the
student movement in Mexico. Rosenberg acknowledged the government’s
uncompromising desire to quell the student movement at almost any cost and stated, “The
Mexican government has clearly indicated that it will go to almost any length to suppress
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the disorders.”50 After providing this claim, Rosenberg went on to endorse the narrative
emanating from the very government whose methods he had criticized. He stated, “There
is no doubt that some Communists and anarchists are involved” in the Mexican student
movement. Rosenberg turned his endorsement of the government into a critique soon
after and showed sympathy to the student cries of brutal repression. Rosenberg claimed,
“the degree of armed force and its use has seemed to many observers out of all proportion
to the provocations.”51 Rosenberg presented both sides of the debate as to who was
responsible for the massacre. In doing so, he created a narrative which nestled
somewhere in between blaming the government or the students for the outbreak of
violence.
Questioning the Government, Endorsing the Students
The New York Times maintained a nonpartisan assessment of the massacre
presented in its cover story on 3 October more so than did the Post. The Post appeared to
largely align with the government version of events for the majority of its coverage. The
Times alternated the viewpoints given and, if anything, the student position was the one
endorsed to a greater extent by the newspaper. The front page of the 4 October New York
Times featured another Paul L. Montgomery article which blamed the government for
escalating the violence needlessly. Montgomery remarked, “A thousand federal soldiers
fired rifles and machine guns at what had been a peaceful student rally in the plaza of a
housing project last night.”52 In fact, the first mention of the violence as a massacre was
in this article when a student leader was quoted as proclaiming, “We have not given up. I
was in that massacre last night, and after that I would never give up.”53 The
condemnation of the government continued on 4 October. John Coker, a heavyweight
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boxer at the Olympics representing Sierra Leone, and an Oxford graduate, stated, “Seeing
what’s going on leaves you appalled. I don’t understand how the Mexican Government
can present one face to the athletes in the outside world, and a different face to their own
youth.”54
The New York Times returned to a more neutral characterization of the massacre
on 5 October. Henry Giniger in his article titled, “Mexican student protest appears to be
crushed,” provided both the Mexican government and the students with fault for
beginning the massacre. Giniger reinforced the government narrative by stating, “The
long and occasionally violent student protest here appeared today to be smashed as a
mass movement following the gun battle in which at least 29 persons lost their lives
Wednesday night.” The story went on to make numerous references to the “clashes”
between students and the government.55 The Mexican government was supported by the
article’s discussion of government supporters, “talk of an outside foreign plot against
Mexico by agitators who provoked the army, by sniper fire into shooting during a student
meeting Wednesday.” The government point of view was immediately followed by the
student view whereby, “Eyewitness accounts of soldiers indiscriminately firing into the
crowd and circumstances surrounding the clash, suggest to some observers a deliberate
Government effort to terrorize the students into quiescence at least for the period of the
Olympic Games.” The depiction of the event as a “massacre” was continued in this
article: “Those students who could be reached on the university campus called the clash
with army troops “a massacre.” Both viewpoints were afforded consideration in Giniger’s
article, although it seems he favoured the student narrative given that the student point of
view was provided to rebuke the government’s assessment of blame.
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The 6 October Times sport section featured two articles which appraised the
massacre. Henry Giniger’s column, unlike his one the previous day, did not go into detail
in providing viewpoints as to who was responsible for the violence.56 The “Sports of the
Times” column, written by Arthur Daley with the subheading, “The Rebels” assigned
blame to the students for causing the violence. Daley wrote, “Having survived the threats
to their previous Olympics from the outside (boycott movements), the dedicated
Mexicans almost choked over their sighs of relief. Hardly had these sighs been released
when new trouble began at home.”57 Daley went on to state,
College and secondary school students, as restless and as rebellious as students all
over the world, began disruptive tactics and riots. Under ordinary circumstances,
the reaction of the Government might not have been so severe. But the nation had
become so obsessed by the Olympics and so fearful of anything endangering their
success that the crackdown was swift and violent. Many were killed in the
suppression of the rioting.58
The political agenda, and underlying assumptions, which informed Daley’s article, were
clear. Though some balance was present in the article, the description of the Mexican
students as restless and rebellious and utilizers of disruptive tactics and riots to achieve
their goals made the endorsement of the Mexican government narrative evident.
Given Daley’s condemnation of disaffected students around the world, his stance
towards Mexico’s students was perhaps inevitable. In addition to Daley laying the blame
for the violence on the students, he was unsympathetic towards their losses of life: “Many
were killed in the suppression of the rioting.”59 His flippant disregard for the loss of life
aligns with the overall tone of the article, which demonizes the students, while appearing
unalarmed with the government’s actions.
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Seemingly deaf to the report filed by Daley two days earlier, Henry Giniger on 8
October wrote an article titled, “Dissident accuses Mexican regime. Ex-party leader
criticizes ‘Witch-Hunt’ on protests,” which questioned the government’s actions at
Tlatelolco. In the article, Carlos A. Madrazo was called “Mexico’s best-known political
dissident” and the article continued by stating “the Government was carrying on a witchhunt instead of solving the country’s problems.”60 Madrazo, formerly the head of the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), claimed that solutions were needed to Mexico’s
many societal issues that did not involve the use of guns, but rather through social,
economic, and political measures.61 The article continued its inquisition of the
government’s actions by proclaiming, “The Government is now attempting to build up a
case against the students and some of its political opponents as instigators of a subversive
effort to overthrow the Government and install a Communist regime.”62 Giniger provided
significant representation to the peril of the students in this article, in addition to his
questioning of the Mexican government. Implicit within the article was the assumption
that the government needed to be questioned and the students were not the perpetrators of
the massacre. Giniger made his skepticism of the government’s actions clear by claiming
they were building or creating a case not based on reality.
On 10 October, the Times perspective on the massacre raised questions over the
legitimacy of the Mexican students. A page 10 Reuters article titled, “Students demand
voice” stigmatized the students by remarking, “Student leaders announced at a
clandestine news conference tonight that there would be no talks with the Mexican
government until more political prisoners were released from jail.”63 The clandestine
reference suggests the students were a subversive, secretive, and illegitimate group,
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thereby questioning their motives. The article also portrayed the students as rash and
petty, given that if their demands were not met dialogue with the government would
cease.
Again the representation of the massacre in the Times was altered and reports
treating the Mexico City massacre were harsh towards the government, and sympathetic
towards the students. In a 12 October editorial titled “Ferment in Mexico” the
government was criticized as undemocratic and suspicious. The Times stated, “For most
of this century Mexico has been governed by Latin America’s strongest, most durable
political party- The Institutional Revolutionary Party. It is a peculiar organization. The
party chiefs claim to be the sole legitimate interpreters of the Mexican revolution.”64
Encoded within this article was the assumption that the power-thirsty Mexican
government was an unyielding entity which did not take kindly to other points of view.
The editorial, therefore, questioned the Mexican government’s ideals, easily leading
readers into questioning its role in the massacre.
Meanwhile, on page 45 of the same day’s Times issue, Robert Lipsyte described
Tlatelolco as, “the murderous snuffing out of Mexican student rioting.”65 Even on 14
October, in an article regarding the Mexican government theory that foreign elements had
infiltrated the Mexican student movement and caused the massacre, the author of the
piece questioned this narrative. Henry Giniger, a staunchly pro-student, anti-government
proponent for the assessment of who started the massacre, claimed, “A complicated
picture of plotting, involving the United States and other outside interests, is being
presented to the Mexican people as an explanation of the prolonged student unrest and
the serious violence that has accompanied it.”66 Giniger’s skepticism of the government
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continued when he wrote, “Strong overtones of xenophobia pervade the various
accusations, which tend to make Mexicans look outside their borders for the source of
their recent troubles rather than to seek it in the internal political, economic, and social
situations and whatever defects they may have.”67
On 21 October, however, questions were raised over the pro-student stance to
some of this coverage in the Times in a “letter to the editor” by Jorge Castañeda,
Ambassador Chief Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mexico. Castañeda contested the
assessment of the massacre given by Paul Montgomery on 4 October and presented the
opposing viewpoint. Issue was taken with Montgomery’s appraisal that the government
instigated the violence. Illustrating his outrage with Montgomery’s article he stated, “in
my view gives a false impression of the events.” Castañeda provided an alternative which
charged that, “the firing started from a fourth floor balcony of the Chihuahua Building,
on the eastern end of the Plaza.”68 This letter claimed that the government was not to
blame for the outbreak of violence, unsurprising given Castañeda’s government
affiliation.
The reporting of both newspapers displayed a level of fairness in providing the
viewpoints of both the Mexican government and the students. The Washington Post,
while allowing for stories centered on the student narrative that the government started
the violence, appeared to generally endorse and publicize the government narrative.
Owing to the Post’s relative reliance, in comparison to the Times, on major news
agencies, like AP and Reuters, to provide their Mexico City massacre coverage, it seems
that these reports favoured the government. One could only speculate as to why these
major news agencies, in sum, endorsed the government’s side of the story and not the
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students. On the other hand, the New York Times on balance favoured the students’ view
of events and was very skeptical of the Mexican government and the stories it was
putting forth in the assessment of blame for causing the massacre. The Times largely used
its own staff reporters to provide the paper’s coverage of Tlatelolco allowing for much
more individualized and opinionated columns versus the rather stock and standard reports
which emanated from the major news agencies. Additionally, Times reporters who
covered the massacre had in-depth knowledge of the political atmosphere in Mexico at
the time, which led Paul L. Montgomery and Henry Giniger- both Latin American
correspondents, with Giniger based in Mexico City- to criticize the government reports
which they regarded as untrustworthy.69 Another Times reporter, sports columnist Arthur
Daley, however, reprimanded the students for instigating the violence. The difference of
opinion between Daley and the other two columnists was stark, and given that Daley was
a sports columnist and not a Latin American correspondent, this opinion divergence
could be explained by a difference in knowledge about Mexico.70
Though both newspapers appeared, by sheer volume of coverage, to favour one
version of the events over the other, both provided ample representation of both
viewpoints. The decision to do so afforded the readership an even-handed and
comprehensive overview of the massacre. The second theme which characterized the
reporting of the Washington Post and especially the New York Times was knowledgeable
and in-depth reporting in the articles regarding the massacre. Though the Post placed
some reliance on news agency reports of the massacre, a significant amount of its
coverage was written by its own columnists. The context of the student movement as a
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whole that was presented provided readers a deeper understanding of how the massacre
occurred.
The Massacre Does Not Paint the Whole Picture
The Mexico City massacre on 2 October 1968, provided a final punctuation mark
to the Mexican student unrest which had been occurring since July 1968. Instead of
superficially providing their readers with stories regarding the 2 October event in
isolation, both the New York Times and the Washington Post presented deeper context to
help enhance the understanding of why the violence occurred. Implicit within this
broader and more in-depth coverage of the massacre was that the readers of the two
newspapers were interested in and were knowledgeable of Mexican issues. Readers
exhibited these traits which were encoded within many of the newspaper reports through
“letters to the editor” which showed the active engagement segments of the readership
had with the Mexican student movement and the massacre.
The New York Times’ first story about the massacre on 3 October 1968 considered
the wider context of Mexican student unrest. The article stated, “Until the troops moved
in, it seemed that both the Government and this city’s rebellious students were working to
establish an atmosphere of calm after some 10 weeks of struggling.”71 Likewise, the
Washington Post’s 4 October story stated that, “Rioting has shaken Mexico City since
mid-July when students struck in protest against government police.”72 These initial
confrontations with the massacre illustrate the immediate connections both newspapers
made between the massacre and the Mexican student movement which had been ongoing
throughout the summer months. These reports set the precedent of acknowledging the
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wider Mexican student movement which was continued in subsequent coverage of the
massacre.
Henry Giniger of the Times provided contextual information about the Mexican
student movement in his column about the aftermath of the Tlatelolco violence. On 5
October, Giniger stated, “The protest movement began at the end of July after clashes
with policemen and soldiers which led to student charges of government brutality and
violations of the constitutional right of assembly.”73 Lewis H. Diuguid, of the Post, also
provided such background insight on 6 October in his column that stated, “During the
campus strikes, rallies, troop occupations and occasional clashes since late July, the
student leadership has settled on a half dozen demands as the price for restored order.”74
Demand for more extensive coverage of Mexican stories was evident in the 4
October “letter to the editor” in the New York Times written by Ramón Eduardo Ruiz of
Smith College Northampton Massachusetts. The letter, under the title “Mexico City
unrest” was written on 1 October and finally published in the wake of the events on 2
October. Ruiz lamented the lack of significant coverage of the student unrest in Mexico.
He wrote,
Judging by the content of letters to The Times, recent events in Mexico have made
no impression on the American public. Yet the student demonstrations in Mexico
City and their harsh repression by President Diaz Ordaz and his underlings may
create a situation that would dwarf by comparison our “Cuban problem.” Far from
being the model for other Latin American nations to imitate, Mexico still
embodies most of the general ills common to the southern republics.75
Though Ruiz was exacerbated over the lack of engagement with the issues of Mexico
City- which, as shown by Kevin Witherspoon in Before the Eyes of the World, were
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highlighted in the Times throughout the summer of 1968- the inclusion of his letter served
as notice that segments of the readership were engaged with this Mexican issue.
Giniger continued to write columns attending to the broader student movement in
his 6 October article. Giniger commented, “For more than two months, students here
have been staging a strike and accompanying it with street agitation.”76 Lewis Diuguid
followed in kind with a well-informed appraisal of the massacre when he, on 7 October,
wrote, “Conversations with politically aware Mexicans at all levels in the capital reveal a
general unrest based on this realization: there was much more involved in the Plaza of the
Three Cultures battle Wednesday night that just a conflict between student and law
enforcement officers.”77 Diuguid’s assertions reflected the divisive elements within the
Mexico City and spoke directly to politically-aware individuals in Mexico City who
understood, more clearly, the implications of the massacre.
Henry Giniger persisted in highlighting the drawn out conflict between the
students and the government in Mexico. Giniger signified that the student movement was
“long-standing” within Mexico and was aimed at changing Mexico to reflect a more
egalitarian society.78 Giniger echoed his sentiments on 10 October by referencing the
protracted conflict between the students and the Mexican government. Giniger wrote,
“Representatives of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz and leaders of the student protest
movement have begun to explore ways of organizing negotiations to end almost 10
weeks of conflict.”79 The New York Times editorial of 12 October described Tlatelolco as
the crescendo of “three months of student disorders.”80 The next day, Giniger commented
that Tlatelolco had experienced the culmination of, “two months of student unrest and
agitation” featuring the “bloody gun battle” which capped off the student movement.81
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Shirley Povich sustained the representation of the larger Mexican student movement on
11 October in the Post. After discussing the massacre and the possible impacts it would
have on the Games, Povich argued that Tlatelolco was not a one-off event. He remarked,
“The student police battles have claimed 50 lives since July” before claiming, incorrectly,
that, like the ancient warring tribes of Greece, truce between the combatants needed to be
reached for the sake of the Olympic Games.82 The continual context given in these
reports provided readers with an understanding of what had occurred in Tlatelolco on a
deeper level.
Three distinct instances of reader engagement with the reporting of the massacre
exemplified reader knowledge and insight into the story. On 13 October, the Washington
Post featured a lengthy article by travel editor Morris Rosenberg highlighting the
potential ramifications the massacre would have on Americans travelling to the
Olympics.83 In the article, Rosenberg revealed that Charles H. Guptill, director of the
Mexican Foreign Press Office, Department of Tourism, wrote to Rosenberg outlining the
issues he had with Rosenberg’s characterization of the Mexican government-student
violence in the summer. Guptill explained, “It was felt that such a reassuring note was
needed exactly to offset such hysterical reports as you quote about ‘an orgy of blood,
teenagers faces slashed by bayonets’ and the relative beneficence of the ‘police
shenanigans in Chicago.”84 Guptill was attempting to re-orient the descriptions of
Rosenberg’s last column which described the Mexican violence in terms unfavourable to
the government. Guptill also shot back at the apparent hypocrisy inherent in Rosenberg’s
article, and the Post’s accounts of the Mexican government violence versus American
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civil unrest- which Guptill felt was handled delicately whereas Mexican disorder was
criticized heavily.
Reader engagement with the massacre and Mexico in general was shown further
on 15 October in a “letter to the editor” in the Washington Post. Frank J. Bonora, who,
through his observations, displayed thorough knowledge of the internal situation of
Mexico’s student unrest, realized the opportunity to turn the massacre and student unrest
into song, channeling his best Rodgers and Hammerstein impression. Bonora wrote:
The Hills of Latin are alive with the Sounds of Guerrilla Warfare. And a tone deaf
Congress conducts the Alliance for Progress with the professionalism of a high
school glee club and the budget of a barbershop quartet. But the beat goes on,
from the Halls of Montezuma to the very tip of Tierra del Guego. It’s up, up, and
away with the Concerto of Campesinos, the Bolero of Barrios, overtures to
tomorrow’s Vietnams. And the greatest spectacle of them all, from the Plaza of
Three Cultures, a Mayan mazurka, a fiery flamenco of freedom, dance by students
to the accompaniment of the gunned-guitars of the granaderos. But the beat goes
on.85
Bonora’s letter, original and unique, displayed an acute awareness of the internal
situation in Mexico and represented reader engagement with the Mexico City massacre.
Also highlighted in his ode to Mexico was an understanding and confrontation with the
potential implications of the massacre and Mexican student unrest on America.
Finally, on 21 October, the New York Times featured a “letter to the editor” which
took issue with Paul L. Montgomery’s article concerning the Mexico City massacre.
Jorge Castañeda, Ambassador Chief Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico
wrote a letter on 11 October which vehemently disagreed with Montgomery’s criticism of
the Mexican government’s handling of the situation on 2 October. In no uncertain terms,
Castañeda lambasted Montgomery’s account of the events, writing, “The story by Paul L.
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Montgomery in the Times of 4 October regarding the violent clashes between Mexicans
students and the army on the night of 2 October in my view gives a false impression of
events.”86 Castañeda, claimed he would, “not attempt to explain or interpret what
happened, but merely to rectify one question of fact regarding the moment and
circumstances in which the army opened fire.” Evidently Castañeda was not comfortable
with Montgomery’s version which implicated blame for starting the violence toward the
government of which he was a part. Castañeda particularly disagreed with Montgomery’s
claim, “a thousand federal soldiers fired rifles and machine guns at what had been a
peaceful student rally in the plaza of a housing project.”87
Castañeda explained his vantage point: “from my office in the sixteenth floor of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the southern edge of the Plaza of Three Cultures and
overlooking the whole area” and recollected his version of the events which precipitated
the violence. Castañeda remarked, “From my clear and vivid recollection, shared by
several colleagues and assistants, the firing started from a fourth floor balcony of the
Chihuahua Building, on the eastern end of the Plaza.” Castañeda’s sentiments reiterated
the government narrative that snipers initiated the violence. His, “vivid recollection” was
shared amongst his colleagues, presumably also government workers, suggesting that
their version was the correct one. Castañeda then dismissed Montgomery’s account,
stating that given his own recollections of the events, “It is therefore patently false that
the army charged and fired at a given signal against the students assembled in the Plaza.
Unfortunately this story has only served to add fuel to the fire.” After forwarding the
government narrative, working hard to make it seem legitimate in the process, and
marginalizing the student narrative put forth by Paul Montgomery, Castañeda tried to
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position himself and his letter as open-minded by concluding, “It is not advanced to
justify or to blame anyone.”88 The reader engagement evidenced by the numerous letters
to the editor elucidated the depth of knowledge of some readers concerning the unrest in
Mexico. Readers knew that civil unrest had been occurring for months.
‘Wild bullets are notoriously unconcerned about nationality:’ Visitor Safety
The assessment of the massacre by the Times and the Post displayed a level of
awareness over the issues of safety facing those travelling to Mexico City to compete in,
or watch, the Olympics. Numerous articles featured questions over issues of security to
not only the Olympic competitions but the athletes and spectators. This awareness played
into the wider theme of the knowledgeable and in-depth reporting on the massacre, but
also served to highlight the perils facing those travelling to the Games as a warning.
The Washington Post, on 4 October, set the precedent for its focus on potential
impacts on those travelling to Mexico with its column, “Riots by students worry
Olympians.” The article explained, “Athletes at the Olympic Village knew little or
nothing about Wednesday night’s student riots, but some team delegations were worried
about their safety and recommended a meeting of all chef de missions to discuss the
matter.” Per Stroemboeck, chief of the Swedish delegation, encapsulated the concern
alluded to by the article when he was quoted as opining, “When the students start
demonstrations during the opening ceremonies it could be extremely dangerous for our
athletes. We should discuss the matter and ask the Olympic organizing Committee for a
full guarantee of all our athletes. I do not want to take any risks for my girls and boys.”89
The inclusion of Stroemboeck’s parental concern for his, “girls and boys” underlined the
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Post’s recognition of the gravity of the danger the massacre presented to those in Mexico
City.
Perhaps the level of concern held by these newspaper writers was a reflection of
general American worry of the potential for similar unrest in the United States. The
Post’s 5 October editorial titled, “Night of Sorrow,” bespoke the Post’s editors’
recognition of possible parallels between Mexico and America. The editorial stated the
Mexico City massacre, “carries an ominous warning for the United States. This country
has already had examples of its own in which National Guard troops, panicked by what
they took to be sniping, fired recklessly into inhabited dwellings and killed innocent
observers.”90 The analogous handling of the massacre’s aftermath by President Díaz
Ordaz to Lyndon Johnson’s handling of student rioting further accentuated the
connections of the massacre to the United States, directly or indirectly. The editorial
continued by claiming, “The failure of President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz to go on record,
personally, in the matter of the rioting, has evoked the defense that LBJ said nothing
when the students rioted at Columbia.”91 The similarities drawn between the two
countries in the article served as notice for the possible ramifications of the massacre to
the U.S.
Morris Rosenberg personified the Post’s writers’ concern for the safety of those
travelling to the Olympics in his 13 October article, “At Olympic time, Mexicans worry
about mañana.”92 This column clearly articulated the potential safety issues Americans
were to face in light of Tlatelolco. Rosenberg wrote, “What is happening in Mexico City
should be of concern to every tourist who is contemplating a visit to the ancient realm of
Montezuma.” He continued, “As this is written, the Olympic Games were still scheduled
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to begin Saturday. The Mexican government has clearly indicated that it will go to almost
any length to suppress the disorders to make the city safe for an Olympiad.”93 Rosenberg
concluded by remarking, “This travel editor herewith warns the American tourist to keep
his curious nose far away from any disturbance” because, “wild bullets are notoriously
unconcerned about nationality.”94 The implication here was that though those travelling
to the Games were not causes of the violence, if care was not taken danger could befall
them. Rosenberg also highlighted the Mexican government’s brutality, and implied that
tourists should steer clear of agitating a government which appeared willing to suppress
dissidence at any cost.
The concern for those attending the Games was fortified with American fears that
a spill-over effect from the Mexican student movement could present problems for the
U.S. The allusion of Mexico becoming an unstable civil war state was a concern
punctuated by American intervention into Vietnam, an unstable civil war state. Frank J.
Bonora of Washington emphasized the precariousness of the Mexican situation in his
peculiar “letter to the editor” where he described the Mexican violence as, “overtures to
tomorrow’s Vietnams.”95 The concern levied towards those travelling to the Olympics
was infused to some extent by American worries of potential ramifications of the
violence on the United States. Bonora drew out the parallels between societal issues in
the U.S., as he did the danger of Mexico devolving into a cauldron of communism and
violence, like Vietnam.
The New York Times did not replicate the breadth of the Post’s concerns of the
impacts of the massacre on those at the Games. One column, however, did overtly
display a level of consternation regarding the massacre’s possible consequences to those
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in Mexico City. Steve Cady’s article on 4 October titled, “All is peaceful at Games
Village. Brundage says there is no connection between riots and athletes’ presence”
crystalized the concern over those in Mexico City. The author commented on the,
“strange contrast between crisis and normalcy” given the enclave of stability found in the
village versus the combustible atmosphere elsewhere in the city.96 Cady went on to
describe the almost comedic, “Walkers moving with a hip-swinging gait that would get
them arrested in Times Square” amongst other athletes honing their skills in bloodstained Mexico City.97 Cady proceeded to interview athletes, one of whom was John
Pickett a 17 year old canoeist from Wilkes-Barre Pennsylvania who stated that he wasn’t
aware that anyone was killed in the rioting because, “They don’t tell us much out here,
we don’t get the papers, so we don’t know.”98 When Cady asked an “attractive
‘edecánes’”-the female Mexican hostesses who provided information to international
guests during the Games- the distance from the Village to Tlatelolco she remarked, “Oh,
that’s very far away. Twenty miles.”99 That quote, like much of the article, made the
Olympic Games appear laughable in comparison to what had just occurred at Tlatelolco.
The safety issues to those entering Mexico City were expressed through the discussion of
the proximity of the violence to the Olympic facilities.
Other New York Times articles showed concern for those travelling to the
Olympics through a consistent questioning and criticism of the Mexican government
which raised the alarm that safety was not their foremost strength. Henry Giniger, on 6
October, wrote an article titled, “Olympics 1968: Mexico City is Ready.” In the story he
described that the violence in Mexico had abated and that those travelling to Mexico City
likely would be safe and warmly greeted when he claimed, “despite the tension, the
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Olympics still seem to have the wholehearted support of most people, and visitors will
find them friendly and eager to please.”100 On 10 October Giniger again remarked, “The
reduction of tension made most people here breathe a little easier about the Olympic
Games opening Saturday, for which thousands of foreign athletes, officials and spectators
are now in the city.”101 This article inferred that decreased combustibility of tension in
Mexico City was a positive sign because of the lessened danger for those present at the
Games. These obtuse displays of concern for the safety of those in Mexico were fortified
by the Times’ incredibly in-depth coverage which allowed readers to understand the
gravity of the situation in Mexico City and, thereby, gave an awareness to the danger one
would be in if one attended the Games.
Final Thoughts
The New York Times and Washington Post both afforded the Mexico City
massacre significant representation during October 1968. While the Times almost
exclusively utilized its own staff to report on the massacre and the Post’s coverage
consisted of combination of the use of news agency reports and its own staff, certain
themes pervaded the content of both newspapers. This coverage was highlighted by
knowledgeable, in-depth, balanced, and non-partisan reporting, and acknowledged the
potential dangers for visitors. The reporting of each newspaper provided readers a
nuanced account of the massacre and did not embrace either the government or student
versions of the event completely. The inclusion of multiple viewpoints of the violence
allowed readers the opportunity to reach their own conclusions as to why, and how, the
massacre came to be. With the knowledge base provided in the coverage, the inferences
made by the newspaper reports appeared reasoned and well thought out. The
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characteristics of both newspapers’ coverage of the massacre provided readers rich
descriptions balanced with contextual information and impending consequences. The
competing narratives presented in these newspapers highlighted the divisiveness of the
massacre, even in its aftermath.
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Chapter 4: The Canadian Newspapers Response to
Tlatelolco
“It is one of the strange phenomena of Mexico City that a battle can be taking place in
one part of the City, while the plush ‘Pink Zone’ of the city dances and drinks the night
away” described Christopher Brasher, author of Mexico 1968: A Diary of the XIXth
Olympiad.1
By 1968 Canada had positioned itself as a highly moral nation, one which stood
up for the protection and recognition of human rights throughout the world.2 A
strengthening Canadian political and economic relationship towards Latin American
nations was built in the 1960s, making major events which occurred in the region more
likely than before to warrant significant media coverage.3 Investigation into the responses
by two major Canadian newspapers, the Ottawa Citizen and the Globe and Mail, presents
insights on the Mexico City massacre and the dominant discourses presented to readers of
these newspapers. Additionally, government debates and speeches, popular Canadian
magazines, and personal correspondence from Canadian IOC member James Worrall
were examined to further situate these newspaper responses within a broader Canadian
framework. The newspaper coverage was analyzed by utilizing Stuart Hall’s
encoding/decoding, as was done in the previous chapter.4 Themes emerged from these
two major Canadian newspapers which show a glimpse into how the Canadian media
covered this event in the month of October 1968. The themes which characterized the
reporting of the massacre by these Canadian newspapers, as well as the other sources
examined, reflects the political tightrope Canada was walking in its emerging political
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relationship with Mexico during the Cold War era and the limits to information presented
by the almost exclusive use of news agencies data for source material.
Context
Though Canada and Mexico are both situated on the North American continent,
political and economic ties between the two countries were relatively limited in 1968.
Although Canada and Mexico eventually grew to be among one another’s largest trading
partners, and members of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
diplomatic relations between the two were only struck in 1944.5 During the Second
World War, during Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s
administration, the government and Canadian business community began to view Latin
America as an untapped resource for investment and creation of positive political
relations.6 To ensure Latin America was ripe for courtship as a political and economic
ally and resource, Canada carried out due diligence by sending a trade commissioner to
Mexico City.7 Pragmatically, another important consideration for Canada to enter
political and economic relationships with Latin American nations stemmed from
American and Canadian concerns that Latin American countries may gravitate towards
supporting the Axis, Nazi Germany and Japan most notably, in the Second World War.8
The cultivation of relations with Mexico proved both opportunistic and practical for
Canada.
Once diplomatic relations were formalized by Canada and Mexico, the countries
quickly began to develop robust political and trade relationships. Though contact and
linkages between the two North American nations were limited prior to the opening of
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diplomatic relations, by 1945 Mexico was the second largest Latin American importer of
Canadian goods, valued at 8.2 million Canadian dollars.9 By 1965, the economic
relationship rose to 51 million Canadian dollars of exports to Mexico. Despite this
substantial increase, it must be noted that Canadian exports to Latin America accounted
for less than 2% of total Canadian exports in 1945 and by 1965 this figure had only
reached 3.7%.10 Mexico reciprocated, sending many products to Canada. Among Latin
American, countries in 1965 Mexico was the third largest exporter to Canada sending
27.2 million Canadian dollars worth of products.11 Canadian-Mexican relations in the
mid-1960s might best be characterized as relatively new, improving, and expanding, with
significant room for growth.
Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada in the latter part of 1968, increased
official Canadian government interest in Mexico owing to that country’s potential
opportunities for trade and investment for Canadians.12 Trudeau sent a ministerial
mission to Latin America to seek out trade and investment opportunities.13 The increased
inter-dependence of the two countries manifested itself in Canadian exports to Mexico
rising to 54.6 million in 1968 from 51 million 3 years earlier.14
Under Trudeau, Canada developed an ever growing presence in Mexico. New
economic opportunities were realized rapidly. However, these new trade agreements
represented a very small part of Canada’s overall economic picture. Nevertheless, Canada
and Mexico each recognized the importance of valuable political relations. Unlike the
major newspapers of Mexico, the newspapers of Canada were not controlled by the
government. Yet newspapers in Canada were subject to the dominant political and social
values of the era, including government political interests.15 Neither the Globe nor the
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Citizen employed direct contacts with Mexico in the form of correspondents or bureau
chiefs. Consequently, news received from Mexico was not first-hand which had a direct
influence on Canadian coverage of the massacre.
Thematic Analysis
The Ottawa Citizen and Globe and Mail’s coverage of the Mexico City massacre
was prominent and abundant on the days immediately succeeding the massacre, 3 and 4
of October. After those two days, which featured front-page articles in both newspapers
reporting on the massacre and multiple articles about the massacre in each day’s paper,
the coverage of Tlatelolco decreased precipitously. Throughout both the voluminous
amount of coverage on the 3rd and 4th and the significantly less coverage in the days after,
certain themes were evident in the Citizen and Globe and Mail during October 1968.
Dominant discourses informed segments of the Canadian public on the details of
the Mexico City massacre. Themes emerging from these dominant discourses were
encoded with specific structures of meaning which shaped the reporting of the massacre.
In effect, the reporting on the massacre reflected the political relationship between
Canada and Mexico in 1968. These Canadian newspapers supported the Mexican
government, a contrast to the more multi-dimensional reporting in the United States.
More specifically, the reports reflected the narrative of the massacre put forth by the
Mexican government wherein the massacre was described as a battle caused by rebellious
students. The newspapers also treated the Olympic Games with paramount importance, as
political events, such as the massacre, were constructed as unseemly intrusions onto the
altruistic Olympics. Additionally Maclean’s and Saturday Night, the Canadian
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government, and the C.O.A. remained silent on the massacre apart from an off-hand
remark by one Canadian Member of Parliament (MP).
Endorsement of the Mexican Government Narrative: The Massacre as a Battle
The Citizen and the Globe both reflected the narrative of the massacre put forward
by the Mexican government. The view of the massacre the government utilized was one
which considered the massacre to be a battle necessitated by unruly students who were
disturbing the otherwise peaceful and prosperous Mexican nation. This narrative served
many purposes for the government. It absolved them of blame for starting the massacre
and served to legitimize their use of force to restore peace. Equally, the government was
eager to assure the world that the unrest had been dealt with, and therefore the Olympic
Games would run smoothly and uninterrupted.
The Mexican government portrayed the massacre as a battle between two
combatants. Doing so legitimized the use of force to suppress the students, given that the
students were engaging them in armed conflict. The “battle” theme put forth by the
Mexican government was dominant in the Citizen and Globe’s coverage of the massacre.
Both newspapers continually referred to the massacre in militant terms and, in general,
situated the event as a conflict between two willing, and relatively equal combatants. The
positioning of the massacre in such a manner suggests that these newspapers were
accepting the narrative emanating from the Mexican government at face value. The
Mexican press, which was government-controlled, labelled the massacre as a conflict
between two relatively even sides, shown by reference to student snipers, on whom the
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blame for initiating the conflict was placed. Both the Globe and Citizen depicted the
students as combatants in this battle for Tlatelolco.
The battle characterization began immediately after the massacre on the front
page of the 3 October edition of the Citizen. The front page article stated the massacre
was,
The bloodiest battle yet of Mexico City’s student rebellion rages through the night
after a rifle shot touched off a thunderous crossfire between snipers and army
troops at the crowded site of an anti-government rally Wednesday. Students
roamed the streets with .22 calibre automatic pistols and Molotov cocktails setting
dozens of buses and cars afire.16
The allusion to a thunderous crossfire connotes a battle image of two sides attacking one
another. Additionally, describing the students as violently roaming the streets further
entrenches the narrative that both sides, the government and students, engaged in armed
conflict.
This representation of the massacre positioned the newspaper’s underlying
assumption that the massacre was started by the unruly and rebellious students and that a
battle was the government’s attempt to contain the situation. The image invoked by
describing students trekking the streets of Mexico City, weapons in hand, and bent on
destruction, directly implicated the students as the party responsible for causing the
violence. This related theme will be revisited later. The Citizen designated the violence as
a student “riot.” Characterizing the massacre as such served to condone the government’s
use of force and, therefore, absolved it of wrongdoing. Page 21 on 4 October in the
Citizen continued describing the massacre as a battle with the headline: “Olympic Games
going ahead despite Mexican student riots.” The article framed Mexico City as “a tale of
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two cities- one of athletic youth of the world and the other of riot-blooded Mexican
college students.”17 The stark contrast established through this representation created a
dichotomy between the supposedly violent student movement and the innocent athletes
about to descend upon the city.
The Globe and Mail, too, constructed a similar battle narrative. The Globe’s 3
October front page coverage of the massacre stated, “Students battled troops and police in
Mexico City last night… An Associated Press photographer reported seeing many bodies
of persons shot down in a square in an exchange of automatic gunfire.”18 The use of the
word “exchange” indicates an understanding that the battle was between two sides
fighting one another. The Globe and Mail aligned with the Citizen leading Canadians to
believe that a battle occurred. The “battle” narrative continued in the Globe on 4 October.
A front page article title declared, “Olympics to go on despite rioting.” The article went
on to claim that “Savage clashes between student rebels and army troops Wednesday
night left a death toll variously estimated at 20 to 40.”19 The use of such language
absolved the Mexican government of any responsibility.
The labelling of the massacre as a battle served multiple purposes. The battle
narrative created more compelling storylines by allowing articles to invoke an the
impression of an evenly matched struggle rather than an unarmed student group being
murdered by government forces. Such interpretations empathized with the Mexican
government. Reports were taken at face value while, at the same time, questions
concerning the violent actions of a trade neighbour went unexplored. The question
remains as to why these Canadian newspapers presented the massacre in this manner.
Alternative reports were available as American newspapers provided significant attention
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to the plight of the students in this situation. Many of these alternative reports
contradicted the sentiments expressed by the Mexican government and the reports which
emanated from the major news agencies. Why then, were these alternative reports
available from American newspapers not included within the Canadian newspapers?
Simply stated, there were no Canadian journalists on site and the Canadian media
supported the government of a favoured trading partner, one that was about to welcome
the world at the Olympic Games.
Student Rebels and Army Troops
Related to the theme of the massacre as a battle, was the insistence on the
newspaper reporting of Tlatelolco that the students were antagonists and the instigators,
of the massacre. The Mexican government was quick to blame the violence on the
students, and continually referenced them as a militant group bent on destruction. Some
examples of this theme were provided in the section above, notably that the Citizen on 3
October stated, “Students roamed the streets with .22 calibre automatic pistols and
Molotov cocktails, setting dozens of buses and cars afire.” The same report claimed that
“snipers were shooting at ambulance drivers.”20 The descriptions of the students as an
uncontrollable mob were also evident in the Globe and Mail which, on 3 October, stated
that, “After being shot at, the students went on a rampage.”21 The Globe and Mail also
mirrored the Citizen’s insistence on demonizing the students as it described the two sides
of the conflict in a dichotomous manner. The Globe stated the battle was a savage one
between, “student rebels and army troops.”22 The theme of characterizing the students as
trouble-makers and implicating them as culpable for starting the massacre readily lent
itself to the descriptions of students as rebels. To enhance the narrative that the students
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were the ones causing the violence, the portrayal of the army and police as orderly
peacekeepers further accentuates the Canadian newspaper endorsement of the
government narrative. The Citizen published a headline which exemplified its
demonization of the students: “Olympic Games going ahead despite Mexican student
riots.”23
The Globe continued on 8 October, stating that, “Decision by the rebel student
governing body, the Committee 210, to not protest during the Olympic Games.”24 Dick
Beddoes of the Globe and Mail concurred. In an 11 October article Beddoes advanced
the sentiment that the students were at fault. He remarked, “shots from rebellious students
will not be heard, apparently because revolution has been scrubbed from the Olympic
program.”25 Beddoes, the only sports reporter covering the Olympics from Mexico City
from the Globe or the Citizen, after witnessing the opening ceremonies, wrote, “The
stadium was surrounded by troops, alert to any rebellious students.” Further, he stated,
“The students have either gone sulking underground or have been gun-whipped into
submission.”26
The Citizen’s one article which provided a measure of balance in reporting the
situation in Mexico even contained this government narrative that the massacre as a
student problem. After describing the Mexican student movement, which included some
insightful comments about Mexican society, blame was still placed at the student’s feet.
In the article, titled, “Olympic Games facing uncertainty as violence continues in
Mexico,” author Jamie Plenn stated, “For nearly 50 years, Mexico has glittered as a rarity
in Latin America- a land at peace with itself. Now the world-wide flame of student
revolution has descended upon her and the fire is being fanned by political
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malcontents.”27 Explicit within Plenn’s story was that Mexico was a safe and peaceful
country until students began misbehaving and causing trouble. This, of course, advanced
the newspaper’s narrative that the massacre was driven by the students. This report, while
demonizing the students, also exonerated the government by making it seem as a force
for positive change given the positive work completed to transform Mexico for the better.
Students were referred to continually as rebels or rebellious Mexicans who posed
the risk of causing further trouble to the Olympic Games, as if causing the Mexico City
massacre was not enough. Though dominant, there were a few stories which presented
the massacre from the Mexican students’ point of view.
On 7 October, on page 18, the Citizen provided a report which featured the
students’ voice. The article’s title reflected the counter-narrative, “Mexican violence:
Students blame police.” The story went on to describe that, “Student leaders blamed
secret policemen, who wore white gloves as a means of identification, for starting
Wednesday’s gun battle that killed at least 35 persons.”28 The article, however, also
claimed that, “The government said anti-nationalist and communist elements were behind
the trouble.”29 By providing the government’s view in the article, the perspective of the
students was challenged and marginalized in one of the few articles to devote attention to
the students’ depiction of the massacre.
Another article to present the students’ version of Tlatelolco was Ronald
Grantham’s “Summary of World News” in the Citizen of 12 October. The news briefs in
Grantham’s column were short; however, he did state: “Student leaders blame secret
policemen for starting a gun battle by firing into a crowd of 6,000 students at a rally.
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They said 150 civilians and 40 soldiers were killed.”30 However, as with the previous
report which gave the student viewpoint, Grantham also included a caveat which called
the student narrative into question. Grantham stated, “The government says at least 35
were killed. It blames anti-nationalist and Communist elements.”31 In both cases, the
qualification of presenting the government narrative after the student narrative
undermined the credibility of the students’ version of the events. Reports featuring the
dominant discourse that students caused the massacre were not tempered with the
inclusion of student opinions.
The Globe and Mail, on the other hand, did provide slightly more voice to the
student’s version and did not augment these reports with the government narrative to the
same extent as did the Citizen. On 7 October, the Globe published an article titled,
“White-gloved police blamed for violence.” This article explained that the students
blamed Mexican secret policemen, who wore white-gloves to identify one another, for
starting the gun battle. The story, however, did portray the government narrative, namely
that communist students were at fault for starting the massacre. However, unlike the
previously mentioned reports which gave legitimacy to the government narrative as
opposed to the students’, the Globe undermined the government position. The story
stated, “The newspaper El Nacional which speaks for the Mexican Government said that
the students’ goal was ‘the abolition of existing institutions in order to pave the way for
arriving at a workers’ and peasants’ Communist state.”32 An underlying assumption to
this representation was that since El Nacional was a mouthpiece of the government, its
views should be taken with a grain of salt.

127

Despite the Globe’s piece on 7 October, the dominant discourse was that the
outbreak of violence was caused by the students. To construct this view, newspapers used
degrading language, such as depicting students as rebels, in order to undermine their
credibility. As a result, acts of violence taken by the government forces appeared to be
necessitated by the creation of armed conflict by the students. Further effects of such
representations obfuscated the longstanding internal problems in Mexico, about which
the students were protesting. At the same time, the Mexican government ensured its
reputation by successfully addressing its internal unrest ensuring a safe and secure
location for the Olympic Games.
Conflating the Massacre and the Olympics
Perhaps reflecting what the world press perceived to be a more important concern,
the Olympics, the Globe and the Citizen’s made a persistent connection between the
massacre and the Games. The conflation of the Mexico City massacre and in some cases
the broader Mexican student movement with the 1968 Olympic Games occurred
consistently during the reporting of the massacre. While scholarship has debunked the
causal relationship between Mexico’s hosting of the Olympics and the student movement,
Mexican students opposed government spending on the Olympics.33 So, while the student
movement broadly was initiated by, and concerned with, more pressing issues in Mexican
society such as income inequality and lack of democratic processes, the Olympics were
an ancillary concern to the students. The massacre itself likely was motivated by the
Olympic Games, but not on the part of the students. The Mexican government, worried
that student demonstrations threatened the upcoming Olympics, was keen to suppress the
student uprising. One only needs to take note of the government forces military unit, in
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conjunction with regular police and army forces, which carried out the massacre: the
Olimpia Battalian. The Olimpia Battalion was a secret Mexican security force trained
specifically for the Olympic Games.34 It was evident in the Globe and the Citizen the
potential ramifications of the massacre on the Games were a significant concern for the
Mexican government.
The Citizen’s 3 October front page headline, “Battle in plaza: 25 Mexicans dieGames will go on,” underscored the central focus on the Olympics. The story quoted
Javier Oftos, Vice-President of the Mexican Olympic Committee, who remarked, “Top
Olympic officials today expressed determination to go ahead with the Games. We have
gone to tremendous effort and expenses to set the stage for what will be a perfectly run
Games.”35 Oftos continued, “The government will take every precaution to see that the
Games are run off without incident.”36 Implicit within these remarks was the notion that
the massacre should be understood through its impacts on the Olympic Games. In spite of
the blood spilled in the Plaza of the Three Cultures, the Olympic Games would continue
unscathed because of the Mexican government’s determination to use any means
necessary to ensure it. The coupling of the Games and the massacre did not subside after
this initial interpretation.
The 4 October headline in the Citizen similarly created a direct association
between the Olympics and the massacre: “Olympic Games facing uncertainty as violence
continues in Mexico.” This article, written by American journalist Jamie Plenn, was one
of the few to provide a detailed study of the Mexican student movement; however the
article was underscored by concern that the Olympics may be harmed by the violence.37
The 4 October Citizen continued, on page 21, to describe the massacre in relation to the
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Olympics, “Olympic Games going ahead despite Mexican student riots.” In the column,
IOC President Avery Brundage was quoted as saying that the IOC had “conferred with
the Mexican authorities and we have been assured that nothing will interfere with the
peaceful entrance of the Olympic flame into the stadium on October 12, nor with the
competitions which follow.”38 The IOC had put its faith in the Mexican government to
ensure the Games would proceed with safety guaranteed. The Globe and the Citizen
appeared to equally accept the assurances of the Mexican government at face value.
In a similar view, the 4 October Globe featured the front page headline,
“Olympics to go on despite rioting.” This article used the same Brundage quotes as page
21 of the Citizen did. This article stated that the Games were, “A veritable oasis in a
troubled world.”39 Implicit here was Brundage’s assumption that a troubled world was
one inflicted by politics, whereas the Olympic Games were or should be free from such
concerns. Without question, the dominant theme expressed in these Canadian
newspapers, immediately following the massacre, focused on the massacre’s impacts on
the Olympic Games.
The Globe continued its focus on the relationship between the massacre and the
Olympics on 7 October with the story titled, “Flame fizzles: Olympic Problems
Continue.” Here the Globe presented another suggestion that the massacre was an
Olympic “problem” to be considered alongside the technical failure of the flame.
Encoded within the report was the assumption that the massacre was comprehensible as
an obstacle to the success of the Olympic Games, not as a tragic loss of life. A similar
article was published in the 7 October Citizen titled: “Olympic torch snuffed in rioting at
arrival.” The article expressed a point of view that the Olympics might be negatively
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impacted by the recent violence: “The Olympic torch started the final leg of its journey to
Mexico City today as fears continued that its flame and the games it represents may be
snuffed out by rebellious students.”40 In these articles, the torch malfunction was used as
a metaphor for the damage that the Mexican students, and the violence they had caused,
could bring to the Olympic Games.
On 8 October, a Globe headline read: “Students offer peace at Games, will halt
rallies,” which associated the massacre and the broader student movement with the
Olympics.41 In the same article, Brundage was quoted as saying, “If our games are to be
stopped every time politicians violate the laws of humanity, there would never be any
international competitions.”42 For Brundage, the Games had to be elevated beyond local
or national politics regardless of violence or loss of life.43 Also on 8 October, an article
titled: “No more mass displays,” appeared in the Citizen. The column stated that the
students had given assurances that they would not interrupt the Olympic Games. The
article remarked, “One storm seemed to abate for the moment, giving organizers a feeling
of reassurance the Olympic Games will have a peaceful opening Saturday.”44
Even fleeting mentions of the massacre in subsequent days referred to the
massacre as part and parcel with the Olympic Games. On 12 October the Citizen’s front
page headline read, “Well-guarded: massive security as Games open.” The article
described the significant security presence at the opening ceremonies and stated that it
was necessitated by “recent clashes between students and followers and the military and
police (which) have killed a reported 50 persons.”45 The story continued by stating,
“More than 6,000 armed troops and police- one for almost every 14 spectators- will be in
the 80,000 seat Olympic Stadium to guard against any outbreak of violence.”46 The 26
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October Globe featured an article which described the massacre as an “acrimonious” start
for the Olympics.47 These reports signified, once again, the influence of the massacre on
the Olympics. The impacts of the massacre on the victims of the violence or the
Canadians about to enter Mexico were not mentioned.
It is possible that the conflation of the massacre with the Olympics served to give
the story more traction and staying power in these newspapers. On 3 October, the front
page of the Citizen featured another Latin American nation experiencing political turmoil,
Peru.48 The Peru story, describing a coup which featured many fatalities, did not gain the
same coverage in the Canadian media. The connection to the Olympic Games may help
explain the increased coverage devoted to Tlatelolco relative to the Peruvian military
coup. Another explanation for the conflation of the massacre and the Olympic Games
was because neither of the newspapers had reporters on the scene and this interpretation
that the massacre and the Olympics were intertwined was uncomplicated.
To encapsulate the concern for the Olympic Games and the insistence that they
not be inflicted with political overtures prompted the Citizen’s 19 October editorial titled:
“Sport vs. Politics.” This editorial was written in the aftermath of another political
intrusion into the Olympics akin to the massacre: the Black Power salute. The editorial
condemned this political act by stating,
Negro sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos have been suspended from the
U.S. Olympic team by that country’s Olympic committee. The action is necessary
if the character of the Olympic games is to be maintained. The ideology behind
the games is to promote sports competition and understanding among nations. The
purpose is not to enable various participating individuals, or nations, to acquire a
convenient arena for the display of their political beefs, however justified they
may be. No fair person would deny that the American Negro has legitimate
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grievances. But it is in poor taste, and indeed a travesty of the Olympic spirit, to
use the facilities offered by the international games as a political platform. 49
The Olympics and politics, according to these newspapers, should not mix.
Neither the Citizen nor the Globe assigned its own staff to write the coverage of
the massacre. Instead, editors turned to major news agency reporting, like the Associated
Press (AP), Reuters, Canadian Press (CP), and United Press International (UPI). Utilizing
news agency reports almost exclusively spoke to the relative lack of “first hand”
coverage of Mexico in these Canadian newspapers, as there were no designated Mexican
correspondents. Using agency news reports also simplified the story of the massacre as
these reports indicated that the violence was caused by the students but, once the student
movement had been crushed, there was no longer need to worry about violence breaking
out in Mexico City.
The discourse created by the Citizen and the Globe empowered a narrative that
the massacre and the Olympic Games were inextricably intertwined. Furthermore, the
attention given to the effects the massacre posed to the Olympics was far more dominant
than the massacre’s impact on either the safety of Canadians entering Mexico or on
Mexican society in general.
Newspaper reports in the Globe and the Citizen containing concern over the
potential danger facing Canadian citizens entering Mexico City for the Games were
limited to one article during October 1968. The reliance on major news agency stories
concerning Tlatelolco served to give a broader, more international viewpoint on the
massacre, a viewpoint with fewer implications for Canadians. The effect of the massacre
on the upcoming Olympics was scrutinized heavily, as was the assignment of blame on
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the students. The impact of the massacre on Canadians entering the country was only
assessed once in the Globe and the Citizen during October 1968.
The Globe on 9 October published a headline titled: “Canadian athletes not
concerned about violence in Mexico: Elder” which touched on the potential impacts of
the massacre on Canadian athletes. The author of the article, Ed Waring, interviewed one
Canadian athlete for the story. The Canadian subject of the story was Norman Elder, an
honors graduate in Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario (’62), who was a
member of the equestrian team. Elder claimed news of the massacre was difficult to come
by: “down there the papers rarely mention the fighting, and only a few of us who frequent
bars and meet members of the student uprising actually know what is going on.”50 Elder
also remarked that he had met many of the Mexican student leaders and had, “got to like
and understand them.”51 The story highlighted the lack of communication to Canadian
athletes about the potentially unstable situation they were stepping into in Mexico City. If
one wanted to access information about the events at Tlatelolco it was incumbent on them
to seek out the information. It could be surmised that because of the general placating of
the Mexican government by the Globe and the Citizen, the extent to which Canadian
athletes were told about the happenings in Mexico City was minimized. This was
possibly because of the Mexican government’s desire to make the story disappear,
evidenced by their narrative of the event. Additionally, as this was the only report which
contained any concern for their well-being or discussion of the feelings of Canadian
athletes towards their security in the wake of the massacre, it was striking that the
journalist only interviewed one athlete. Elder described himself as one who was not
representative as well given that he was one of the “few” who went to bars and mixed
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with Mexican students. As a result, the article’s title which claimed Canadian athletes
were not concerned about the violence in Mexico was exaggerated and unfounded.
Rather, one Canadian athlete was not concerned about the violence in Mexico, and that
one student proved to be the only Canadian Olympic delegation member who represented
his views on the massacre during October 1968.
So pervasive was this theme in the reporting of the massacre that one could infer
that if the Olympics were not being held in Mexico City, the massacre may have in fact
never happened because the students would have had nothing about which to protest.
This fact was presented by the Mexican government, it can be assumed, to mask the
social instability in Mexico due to its economic problems. By conflating the Olympics
with the massacre, attention was drawn away from the massacre and focus was placed on
the Olympic Games, thereby helping the Mexican government to put the whole affair
behind it from a public relations point of view. The Canadian newspapers’ acceptance of
this government narrative helps explain their lack of coverage regarding the possible
issues of safety to Canadians travelling to the Games. In contrast, the American
newspapers, which in general did not accept the government version of events, displayed
concern towards the safety of those travelling to the Olympics. The Globe and the
Citizen’s endorsement of the government story, therefore, signified the Canadian press
accepting the Mexican government’s self-serving assertion that the situation was under
control and that there was no need for concerns over the safety of those attending the
Olympics.
The effects of the articulation of the massacre and the Olympics may have also
served to give coverage of the massacre traction within the Canadian media. The
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Olympics gave the story of the massacre greater recognition within the Canadian media,
likely because the Olympics were a high profile event of international importance. The
fact Canadian athletes were to arrive in Mexico City in a few days was of interest to the
Canadian public, making the issue, in all likelihood, more important to many Canadians.
Dick Beddoes: A Man of Many Hats
Dick Beddoes was the Globe and Mail’s on-site sports reporter in Mexico City
during the 1968 Olympic Games. With this distinction, Beddoes had the opportunity to
report on the Games with personal access in comparison to other Globe or Citizen
writers. Beddoes was a flamboyant character, known by his distinctive attire in his later
years as a sports television personality, which exuded itself in his columns.52 Despite his
chance to provide the Canadian public with knowledge and insight into the major
controversies which occurred during the Games, namely the massacre and the Black
Power protest, his columns did not serve such a function. Rather curiously, Beddoes’s
columns, almost always succinctly titled “By Dick Beddoes,” accompanied by a cartoon
of his likeness, were extraordinarily light and jocular characterized by a peculiar lexicon.
His articles also displayed a level of distaste for the intrusion of politics in the Olympic
Games. Beddoes’s odd treatment of these solemn events was a distinctive theme, given
that his column appeared on almost every day of the Olympics.
On 11 October, Beddoes began his coverage of the Olympic Games. Given the
recent events of Tlatelolco, and given the athletic competitions had yet to begin, Beddoes
took aim at the massacre. His column that day began by providing minor, often trivial
examples of people getting into trouble in preceding Olympics. Beddoes cited the 1936
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Olympics: “Avery Brundage threw a lady named Eleanor Holm off the US Olympic team
for drinking champagne with sports writers, a notorious lot.”53 With the light-hearted
backdrop of instances of trouble being caused at the Olympics, Beddoes proceeded to
provide some comments on the upcoming Olympic Games and some of the problems
associated with them. He stated, “Mexicans are proving that, if nothing else, they’ve got a
very good team in the shooting and revolutionary events. There are- how’s that
stewardess? We’re about to land in the country of Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata?
Splendid. Hand me that bullet-proof vest, will you?”54 The flippant disregard for the
event in his reports is striking, as was his use of black humour to downplay the
seriousness of the fiery events. For Beddoes, as with Brundage, the success of the
Olympics came first at the expense of ignoring human suffering. Beddoes continued his
comedic take on the massacre by concluding, “Unofficial statistics reveal that goodwill
prevails over bad will in the Olympic Games by a ratio of about five to one, a thought to
cherish as one rides a plane toward the Mexican shooting gallery.”55
The Mexico City massacre was not again treated in such a lengthy manner by
Beddoes in the remainder of his columns. However, a few columns addressed the event in
passing. On 11 October, Beddoes’s article titled, “French count beaten in bid to govern
IOC” contained discussion on the IOC presidential election, won by Avery Brundage
who Beddoes characterized as, “the old stuffed sports shirt from Chicago.” At the end of
the report, Beddoes could not resist another tongue-in-cheek remark about the massacre,
“shots from rebellious students will not be heard, apparently because revolution has been
scrubbed from the Olympic program.”56 This article contained the aforementioned theme
that the students were rebels and responsible for starting the massacre. In addition, the
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story contained his trademark frivolous handling of serious issues surrounding the
Olympics. Beddoes, continuing on the same trajectory as his 14 October column
regarding the opening ceremonies, stated, “The stadium was surrounded by troops, alert
to any rebellious students who might protest the presence of Mexican President Gustavo
Díaz Ordaz.” He followed by claiming, “The students have either gone sulking
underground or have been gun-whipped into submission.”57 The dismissal of the plight of
Mexican students, while also implicating them as the agitators, was consistent with the
rest of the Globe and Citizen’s reporting on the massacre. Beddoes’s offhand remarks
about the suppression of the Mexican students, however, are unique. While insensitive, it
appears odd how little Beddoes seemed to regard the ramifications of the massacre to
those involved and focused his coverage so heavily on the Olympics.
No further direct reference to the massacre appeared in Beddoes’s articles again
but his reporting of the massacre was consistent with the rest of his columns during the
Olympics. Specifically, important issues were dismissed, made light of, and treated
irreverently by Beddoes. This was done likely because of his underlying assumption that
the Olympics and politics should be separate from one another. Beddoes, who did not
approve of the Black Power salute, disregarded the event as, “One of the most disgraceful
hangings of dirty linen in the history of the Olympic Games.”58 The next day, Beddoes
continued his assault. His 18 October article lamented the political use of the Olympic
Games. Beddoes cited numerous examples, including, “The late unlamented Mr. Hitler, a
tin-can dictator, refused to shake hands with black US athletes at the Berlin Olympic in
1936” and, “In recent times, the Russians seldom missed an Olympic opportunity to
advertise the cranberry-tinted doctrines of communism.”59 Beddoes, after laying out the
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negative political uses of the Olympic Games, remarked, “These are background strokes
to the disgraceful performance of two US sprinters after the final of the 200 metre dash.”
The article continued, claiming, “There was something ironic seeing them stand on the
victory crackerboxes holding clenched fists aloft in a fascist salute during the playing of
the US national anthem. The late unlamented Mr. Mussolini would have been pleased.”60
He went on to write, “It is presumptuous for an outsider to comment on another country’s
racial turmoil, of course. This is especially true if the outsider is from Canada where our
abuses of Indians and Eskimos have not yet been eradicated for all eternity.” However,
despite this statement, Beddoes went on to make a judgmental statement by remarking,
“It is tasteless, it seems to me, for athletes to shout their country’s woes in an Olympic
forum.”61 The purity and success of the Olympics was paramount according to Beddoes.
The association made between acts committed by Hitler and the Black Power
protest appears far-fetched. The vocabulary used, like “tin-can dictator,” and “victory
crackerboxes,” are examples of Beddoes’ infatuation with humorous language. Beddoes
was not finished in commenting on the Black Power protest and its aftermath, however.
On 22 October, Beddoes wrote a column which described Stokely Carmichael, a Black
Power leader to whom Cuban relay medalists were sending their silver medals as a sign
of solidarity. In a flippant manner, Carmichael was characterized by Beddoes as, “A
rabble rouser of the highest order, chattier than an outraged magpie as he hollers for
revolt in the U.S. streets. Just what he will do with eight silver medals is uncertain,
although I suppose he could boil them down into silver bullets and become the Lone
Ranger.”62 Beddoes seemed to demean factions of the Black Power movement by
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drawing the metaphor of the Lone Ranger into his column, again displaying the lighthearted tint of his reporting in Mexico City.
Overall, the uniquely-positioned Beddoes did not use his temporary residence in
Mexico City to deliver the readers of the Globe a detailed, serious, or insightful account
of the Tlatelolco massacre. Beddoes’ reporting, instead, likely served the function of
helping the Globe sell newspapers by his colourful descriptions of various events. The
idiosyncratic reporting and writing style of Beddoes concerning the massacre and the
Black Power protest, showed his dismissal of the seriousness of these events. Especially
noticeable, amongst his other one-liners, was the irreverent treatment of the massacre by
referring to the students as experts in revolution, and jokingly asking a stewardess for a
bullet proof vest.
All Quiet on the Mexican Front: Popular Magazines and Tlatelolco
While numerous accounts of the Mexico City massacre were provided by the
Globe and the Citizen, silence towards the massacre was the pervading sentiment in other
Canadian print media outlets. The popular Canadian magazines Maclean’s and Saturday
Night did not mention the massacre during October and November 1968. The silence on
the part of these magazines is perhaps unsurprising given the selectiveness of the
Canadian press. The Canadian government has, at times, censored the news, particularly
certain stories which are seen to jeopardize important political relationships with other
countries.63 The Canadian government, eagerly seeking out the Mexicans as a trade
partner may have acted to censor possible news stories regarding the massacre which
may have negatively portrayed the government Canada was courting. Given that news is
a manufactured product, one which is selected and then constructed for an audience, it is
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unsurprising that some news stories are featured over others.64 Additionally, newspapers
and magazines are created in a way to sell as many as possible, making certain stories
more favourable to achieve this goal. Robert Hackett and Richard Gruneau in their study
on Canadian news titled the Missing News: Filters and Blind Spots in Canada’s Press,
found that among the apparent blind spots in the Canadian media were stories regarding
human rights abuses by Canada’s “Friends.”65 The lack of news stories in these popular
Canadian magazines, therefore, becomes less surprising given the tendency of the
Canadian media to avoid such stories, of which the Mexican government murdering its
own citizens was definitely one. When the reluctance of the Canadian media to criticize
countries which are friendly to Canada is coupled with the blind spot of the Canadian
media concerning the consequences of social inequality, the failure of these magazines to
comment on the massacre becomes understandable. Raising the issues of social and
economic equality in Mexico may have been complex and a difficult political posture for
the Canadian government and the Canadian media to comment on.66
The student movement within Canada was afforded the coverage that the studentled Mexico City massacre was not. On page 4 of the Maclean’s October edition, a long
and detailed editorial titled, “Give students a voice- but let’s not let Student Power spell
destruction” provided an exhaustive overview of the issues facing Canadian society as
Canadian students became more autonomous and vociferous. The editorial provided
numerous statements warning of the perils of student power, and ways to remedy its
growth, such as, “The teacher-student relationship is not master-servant, but masterapprentice” and “No false equality please; professors are professors’ because they know
more than students do.”67 The story went on to state that Universities which yielded too
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much power to students would, “invite their own destruction” and claimed that to yield
too much power to students was not reasonable given, “The militants can be quite easily
replaced by qualified students who will accept rational authority and structuring in
university education.”68 The article continued over five pages to describe why Canadian
students are protesting and implementing strike movements against the Universities at
which they study.
It is striking that the Maclean’s October magazine issue, appearing immediately
after a major student movement was crushed by its own government, did not mention the
Mexico City massacre within an article which addressed the Canadian student movement.
The article treated the Canadian student power movement of 1968 as something to be
reckoned with. Yet, treating the Canadian student power movement in isolation served to
imply that student movements across borders were dissimilar and isolated from one
another. Failing to mention other student movements around the world, especially the
suppression of the one in Tlatelolco, the article missed an opportunity to provide context
to its readership. Including an example of how not to respond to student unrest may have
served to show the importance of student movements internationally and the need to take
student demands seriously. Also, the violent response of the Mexican government could
have provided a moment of reflection. Maclean’s did not provide a single story regarding
the Olympics in its October and November 1968 issues, much less a mention of the
Tlatelolco affair.
The content of both magazines focused heavily on Canadian issues. Maclean’s
did not provide content on many of the major international events occurring at the time,
such as the Czechoslovak invasion by the Soviets, Biafra, or the Olympic Games.
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Saturday Night, while still centred largely on Canadian affairs, provided more
international content than its counterpart. The October 1968 issue of Saturday Night
included an article about the Olympic Games. The article titled, “After the Olympics,
carry some Mexican culture home with you: Buy a bullfight half an inch high, or a
miniature madonna” described the many types of souvenirs that were available for
purchase in Mexico. 69 This article, while jovial and lighthearted, displayed some level of
engagement with the upcoming Olympic Games and with superficial aspects of Mexican
culture, like the authentic-looking tourist souvenirs available to those travelling to the
Games.70 Further Saturday Night attention was paid to the struggles caused by Apartheid
in South Africa and the plight of the Czechs in the wake of the Soviet invasion of their
country in the magazine’s November issue.71
In these international stories, Mexico was positioned as an exotic, far-away place
which had little impact on Canada but the international troubles in South Africa and
Czechoslovakia were judged serious concerns which warranted examination. Importantly,
unlike Mexico, South Africa and the Soviet Union were not Canadian allies. Therefore,
highlighting the struggles of the people in those nations was less likely to be filtered by
the Canadian media, making representation more likely than that of the Mexican
situation. The Czechoslovak and South African violations of human rights were deemed
legitimate and worthy of consideration in Saturday Night, whereas the Mexican student
movement was brushed aside to focus on kitschy trinkets available for purchase in
Mexico. The flamboyant novelty of Mexico was accentuated in the article, indicating
little comparison between the student situations in Canada and Mexico because Mexico
was so distant and inconsequential to the Canadian situation. The silence regarding the
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massacre in both Maclean’s and Saturday Night was consistent with the Canadian federal
government’s reaction to the massacre.
Federal Government and C.O.A. Silence
The Canadian federal government in October 1968, under the leadership of Prime
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau, was eager to show Canada as a country concerned with
the rights and freedoms of people around the world. Evidence of this desire was
prominently displayed in the House of Commons debates and in speeches made by the
Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp. In a speech to the United Nations (U.N.)
General Assembly on 9 October 1968, one week after Tlatelolco, Sharp decried the
immoral actions of numerous countries. Sharp lambasted the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia by stating, “The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and
some of its allies, was nothing less than the assertion of a proprietary right of a great
power to exercise domination of Eastern Europe under the guise of a “fraternal”
ideological relation. It was naked power politics without regard to the Charter of the
United Nations.”72 Sharp continued by expressing Canada’s, “sympathy and concern for
the Nigerian people” who were engaged in a brutal civil war. The speech also commented
on the plight of South Africans under Apartheid, as well as violations of human rights in
Vietnam and the Middle East.73
The House of Commons Debates during October 1968 reflected similar concerns
as those mentioned by Sharp in his speech to the U.N. On 17 October, Sharp commented
to his fellow Members of Parliament (MPs) that “When the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany took place, Canada
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condemned it unequivocally.”74 The highlighting of these flagrant violations of human
rights provided an opportunity for Canada to express its indignation.
The federal government narrative on human rights was, of course, limited to
specific political events and did not target allied nations and trade partners. Countries
which were neither allies nor coveted trade partners were targeted and countries like the
Soviets, Nigeria, and South Africa were targeted since they were safe political battles to
wage given Canada’s position in the western bloc. The fact that little relations existed
between Canada and Nigeria or South Africa made for energetic criticism. The failure to
address the Mexican situation in Sharp’s speech to the U.N. or in the House of Commons
demonstrated the government’s reluctance to “weigh in.” Political allegiances dictated a
political response or non-response. Canada, therefore, can be best characterized at this
time to be selectively indignant about human rights abuses.
The national government and MPs were almost certainly aware of the events at
Tlatelolco given its front page newspaper media coverage. However, this awareness did
not translate into discourse around the event, Canada’s response to the massacre, and the
potential impacts on Canadian citizens travelling to Mexico. Mr. Arnold Peters, an MP
from Timiskaming Ontario, in the middle of a long statement regarding the Farm
Improvement Loans Act, was the only MP to refer to the massacre in the House of
Commons. Peters remarked:
I am not one to participate very much in the question period, but I was surprised
nobody asked about the revolution of students in Peru and their participation in
the military coup there. I am also surprised that nobody asked about what may
become a serious problem for the Olympic Games because of the student riots in
Mexico City.75
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No other MPs addressed Peters’ remarks, or raised the issue of the massacre again.
This silence was unsurprising given the 10 October Globe story highlighting the
growing ties between the two countries. Titled “MPs’ free trip to Games in Mexico
cancelled,” the article detailed that five members of Parliament and 12 travelling
companions were going to spend eight days in Mexico. Though the trip was cancelled,
for reasons not given, the nature of the planned trip was indicative of the favourable
relationship that Canada was hopeful of further cultivating with Mexico. Many of the
members scheduled for the trip were of high political clout. They included Health and
Welfare Minister John Munro, MP Lincoln Alexander, and Harold Rae (father of future
MP and Premier of Ontario Bob Rae) the chairman of the Government’s task force on
sports. The group was scheduled to deliver a recorded message, in Spanish, by Prime
Minister Trudeau intended for Mexican radio use.76 The magnified interest of the
Canadian government in forging a stronger relationship with Mexico was further
illustrated in a Citizen article on 26 October headlined, “Latin America Tour will be ‘no
joy ride.” The article explained that five ministers and 20 government officials were set
to tour various Latin American countries, including Mexico, for one month to promote
political, trade, economic, cultural and other ties with Canada.77
Discourse surrounding the Olympic Games in the House was made in the latter
stages of October, though it was not centered on the massacre. The statements pertaining
to the Games were centered on congratulating Canadian athletes, lamenting the lack of
physical fitness amongst the Canadian population, and the lack of funding devoted to
sport. On 18 October, Mr. J.M. Forrestall, MP from Dartmouth-Halifax east, after a long
debate in the House concerning National Health and Welfare proclaimed, “Many of us
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are disappointed that our athletes have not performed as well as might be hoped. The
games are not over yet however, and we still hope that some medals will be brought back
to this country.” Forrestall continued by saying, “I wonder about the true depth of our
participation as a nation in what led up to this tremendous event. We are capable of doing
better. One of the reasons for our failure to do as well as we might have done is that as a
nation we have neglected to do enough to help our athletes.”78
Also on 18 October, Mr. Ray Perrault, MP from Burnaby-Seymour, echoed
Forrestall’s sentiments regarding the plight of Canadian athletes. Perrault explained,
Every time Canada fails at the Olympics, Mr. Chairman, there are people who say
that the game is the thing, that it really does not matter who wins. This is
nonsense” and “We have sent our valiant athletes to Mexico City- and they are
valiant, Mr. Chairman, because in order to get them there we had to have a tin can
collection in Vancouver. We had to beg people for their assistance in getting our
athletes to Mexico City.79
The concern over the relatively poor performances of Canadian athletes at the
1968 Olympics, and the lack of funding for these athletes, comprised the discourse
surrounding the Mexico City Games. The prominence with which these concerns were
aired in the House of Commons underscored the noteworthy place the 1968 Olympics
held within the Canadian government.
The federal government silence regarding the Mexico City massacre was
deafening. Even when the subject was broached in the House of Commons, it was
ignored. In all likelihood, this silence reflected Canada’s recently enhanced political and
trade relationships with Mexico. This silence illustrated the Canadian government’s
unwillingness to address an issue which could have called its relations with Mexico into
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question. At the same time it demonstrated that Canada’s opposition to human rights
violations was politically selective.
There was no mention of Tlatelolco in the personal correspondences of Canada’s
IOC member James Worrall.80 The official C.O.A. report of the 1968 Olympics also
remained silent on the massacre. Instead, the official report contained information
regarding the results of Canadian athletes in sporting events and commended Mexico on
its: “Mexican hospitality, generosity, and most of all in an exquisite and charming city.”81
The C.O.A. official report included statements by Prime Minister Trudeau, who in light
of the poor results of Canadian athletes at the Games lamented: “More Canadians should
be actively concerned about physical fitness.”82 No mention was made of the bloodshed
in Tlatelolco. Perhaps this silence is unsurprising given the C.O.A’s complete alignment
with the success of the Olympics and therefore would be supportive of the Mexican
government’s quashing of the student unrest. Equally explanatory of the silence of James
Worrall owed to his career status during 1968. Worrall was a newly elected IOC member,
and therefore unlikely to stray from the Olympic acceptance of the Mexican government
assurances of safety at the Games. His memoir, My Olympic Journey: Sixty Years with
Canadian sport and the Olympic Games, reflects as much in his short section regarding
the massacre. In his description of the 1968 Olympics, Worrall stated,
The year 1968 was one of unrest and demonstrations in Mexico against President
Ordaz and his government and, while we had all read the news, we in the C.O.A.
had been assured that all was under control and the Olympic Games would not be
affected. Consequently, it came as a nasty shock one morning prior to the opening
of the Games to be told that bloody riots had broken out in the centre of the city.83
This memoir exemplifies the C.O.A.’s acceptance of the narrative of the Mexican
government and makes its silence unsurprising. The ambivalence of the C.O.A. towards
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the unrest in Mexico was summed up by Worrall who claimed, “Apart from this [the
massacre], the atmosphere seemed to be cheerful.”84 While the Canadian newspapers
naively accepted the Mexican government story that the massacre and Olympics were
inextricably connected, the silence of the C.O.A. towards the massacre which had the
potential to negatively affect the athletes was surprising.
Final Thoughts
The silence concerning the massacre was a consistent theme in popular
magazines, the federal government, and the C.O.A. The silence regarding Tlatelolco
signifies the separation of sport from the more serious issues of violence and murders and
also shows that the Olympic Games were viewed as being disconnected from politics.
The omission of content regarding the massacre is made plausible given the political
relationship between Canada and Mexico. Consequently, the newspapers, magazines, and
C.O.A. were all on the same page as the Canadian federal government.
Prior to the Mexico City massacre, no event commonly associated with the
Olympic Games had ever resulted in the number of fatalities and imprisonments. Canada
sent an athletic delegation into this maelstrom of political unrest and government
brutality mere days after the blood was washed from the Plaza de la Tres Culturas. The
newspaper reporting in the Ottawa Citizen and Globe and Mail focused upon two broad
themes which dominated their coverage of the Tlatelolco massacre. First, both
newspapers provided a ringing endorsement of the Mexican government’s narrative of
the massacre. Namely, that a “battle” was contested in the Plaza de la Tres Culturas
between two willing combatants, and that this “battle” was made necessary because of
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the Mexican students who caused the violence. Underlying both sub-themes was the
Mexican government’s desire to assure the international community that the Olympics
were in safe hands and that they were a force for good. The acceptance of the government
narrative by these Canadian newspapers may have been precipitated by the second theme
identified in the newspaper coverage of the massacre. This second theme was that both
newspapers treated the massacre in direct relation to its potential impacts on the Olympic
Games. The reporting treated the Olympic Games with the utmost importance and
appeared concerned about the possible intrusion of political events onto the Olympics,
something which neither paper condoned.
Finally, the theme of silence was evident through the examination of various
popular Canadian magazines, federal government debates, statements, and speeches, and
C.O.A. correspondences and its official report. The silence of these entities regarding
Tlatelolco can be understood as a way of shying away from reporting on human rights
violations perpetuated by Canada’s “friend.”
Taken together, these themes which have been identified in the Globe and Citizen
alongside the theme of silence of other Canadian institutions mirrored the political
relationship between Canada and Mexico. The tepid reporting of these two newspapers
concerning the massacre appears similar to the improving, yet still unsolidified
relationship between Canada and Mexico. It is a fair conclusion that the Canadian media
turned a blind eye to the massacre as the Canadian government sought political cordiality
with Mexico.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
“The world press, in spite of the daily ration of horrors it dispenses, was
shocked,” wrote Octavio Paz in The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid.1
The Mexico City massacre was an event unlike any previously associated with the
Olympic Games. The brutality displayed by the Mexican government in the suppression
of student unrest resulted in hundreds of estimated deaths, with thousands more thought
to be sent to prison. Those present at the massacre were united by their horror at the
incomprehensible violence perpetrated by the Mexican government towards its own
citizens. In the massacre’s aftermath, the international press was faced with competing
narratives which explained the violence at Tlatelolco. The Mexican government
forwarded one version of the massacre which portrayed the students as agitators and
anarchists bent on causing destruction, thereby necessitating their use of force to restore
peace. The students claimed their protest was peaceful and the army, police, and specially
trained forces for the Olympic Games conducted a murderous campaign of violence
without any provocation. With two competing narratives existing, an endorsement of one
version over another in the international press can be seen as a signifier of underlying
political agendas.
American Newspapers and Tlatelolco
Two U.S. newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, provided
significant coverage to the massacre during October 1968. Their reporting of the
massacre was in-depth and knowledgeable and included insights into the precipitating
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factors which led to it. The thorough reporting on the massacre was achieved through the
use of their own staff writing these reports, and also the use of Latin American
correspondents. Connected to the in-depth reporting, these newspapers reported both the
government and the student version of the massacre. This relatively balanced coverage
allowed readers to decipher for themselves what happened in the Plaza de la Tres
Culturas given they had both competing narratives at their disposal. Finally, the
newspapers displayed a level of appreciation for the possible danger that those travelling
to the Olympics would face in the wake of the violence. Doing so acknowledged that
though the Mexican government was making assurances that all would be safe at the
Games now that they had restored peace, these sentiments should not be accepted at face
value. Rather, the newspapers preached caution and the use of common sense to those
descending upon the Games to ensure their well-being.
The reporting of the Times and the Post can be seen as a reflection of AmericanMexican political relations. The well-established links between the two nations led to a
sense of interest and knowledge of Mexican affairs, given their ramifications on the
United States.2 The political friction between the two countries was evidenced clearly
during the lead-up to the 1968 Olympic Games as C.I.A. agents in Mexico regularly
reported their concern over the Mexican student movement and the government’s
inability to adequately resolve the discord.3 Furthermore, the friction which has
highlighted this political relationship bred a sense of suspicion towards one another,
which was reflected in the newspapers questioning of the Mexican government’s version
of the massacre.
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Canadian Newspapers and Tlatelolco
Coverage of the massacre was noticeably different from the representations of the
Times and Post in Canadian newspapers. The Globe and the Citizen reported on the
massacre abundantly during the days immediately after 2 October. After this initial
prominence of coverage regarding Tlatelolco, published articles pertaining to the
massacre were scarce. The relative scarcity of coverage of the massacre after these initial
days of coverage was emblematic of the political relationship between Canada and
Mexico. Specifically, the Canadian-Mexican relationship was new, improving, but not
yet-well established. The newspapers’ diminished coverage of the massacre fit with the
friendly, non-confrontational relations between the two countries as each looked to
strengthen their ties to one another.
The newspapers’ coverage of Tlatelolco was highlighted by their endorsement of
the position of the Mexican government relative to the massacre. Namely, these
newspapers described the massacre as a battle between two combatants, with fault
directed towards the students for starting the violence. This point of view was readily
served up by the Mexican government. Another feature of these newspapers’ coverage
was that the Olympic Games were held in the highest regard, as the newspapers put the
impacts of the massacre on the Olympics as paramount in importance and believed the
impacts of societal problems should be kept apart from the politically-free Olympic
Games. This was evident through the consistent connection the Globe and Citizen made
between the massacre and the Olympic Games, including the potential ramifications the
massacre would have on the Games. Additionally, Dick Beddoes, who alone amongst
reporters at the Globe and the Citizen, had the unique opportunity to be in Mexico City to
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cover the Olympics and championed this reverence for the Games through his assertions
that the Olympics and politics should not mix. Beddoes’ coverage of the Olympics also
was characterized through the levity of his reporting on the massacre and other events,
such as the Black Power salute, which was another distinctive theme apparent in the
Globe’s reporting on the massacre and the Games more generally.
These Canadian newspapers’ coverage of Tlatelolco, therefore, was rather
superficial and did not delve deeply into the wider context of civil unrest in Mexico. The
massacre was treated as an event which could be understood simply in relation to the
Olympic Games and owing to the acceptance of the government version of events, peace
had been restored. This connection to the Olympics becomes understandable given the
reverent treatment of the Games by these newspapers and the paramount importance of
politics not impinging on them. The endorsement of the Mexican government narrative
by these newspapers was a reflection of Canadian-Mexican political relations, which at
this time was flourishing. Rather than put this improving relationship at risk, by including
stories providing the counter-narrative, namely that the government brutally repressed a
peaceful demonstration, the newspapers published the government narrative almost
exclusively. Newspapers included stories which portrayed the students as blood lusting
rebels and the government as restorers of peace. Akin to the representations provided in
these newspapers, popular Canadian magazines and the C.O.A. both took non-critical
stances towards Mexican government’s actions in the massacre. In fact, the popular
magazines Maclean’s and Saturday Night along with the C.O.A. were silent on the issue
of the massacre.
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The silence of the popular news magazines, and indeed the posture of the
newspapers’ reporting, can be understood when the filters and blind spots of the
Canadian press are analyzed. Stories are often stifled when they implicate human rights
violations to Canada’s “friends” and when these articles deal with social inequality.
Equally, the silence of these magazines and the C.O.A. fell in line with the federal
Canadian government’s silence regarding Tlatelolco. The federal government’s role in
suppressing these news stories is unknown; however, given its silence on Tlatelolco it
stands to reason that the government may have played a role in marginalizing counternarrative coverage which would bring up unwanted questions for their Mexican allies.
The C.O.A.’s silence is readily understandable given the organization’s absolute
alignment with the IOC, which proclaimed that the massacre was not connected to the
Olympics and readily accepted the Mexican government’s assurances that safety would
be guaranteed.
The effect of this blind acceptance of the government version of events served to
portray the massacre in, largely, one light. Readers of these newspapers were offered very
little contextual information and their access to competing narratives was restricted to
few published stories. Whether through direct or indirect interference the political
relations between Canada and Mexico were reflected in the narrow and one-sided
portrayals of the massacre in these newspapers. These characterizations of the massacre
can be seen as a reflection of the budding political relationship between Canada and
Mexico.
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Differences between American and Canadian Newspapers Coverage
The differences in American and Canadian newspaper coverage of Tlatelolco
were stark. On one hand, American newspapers presented a comprehensive, balanced,
and critical analysis of the issues. Canadian newspapers, on the other hand, tacitly
accepted the Mexican government’s version of events which resulted in superficial and
simplistic reporting of the issue. These differences were likely born from the different
political relationships each nation had with Mexico. The U.S.-Mexican relationship has
been characterized by William H. Leurs as: “like none other in the world. It is intense,
extremely important, and yet peculiar.”4 The Canadian-Mexican relationship in 1968 was
a relatively new one where both parties were eager to entice the other to create a stronger
relationship. Whereas the United States and Mexico had such an interconnected and long
fortified relationship, Canada and Mexico had nothing of the sort. The long-standing
working relationship with one another was reflected in the American newspapers,
producing, at times, scathing critiques of the Mexican government. Canadian newspapers
effectively offered a conclusive endorsement of the Mexican government’s version of the
massacre, likely owing to the reluctance of Canadian institutions to jeopardize the
improving relations between the two countries.
Future Research
Research regarding the Mexico City massacre has many potential avenues for
examination. The relative scarcity of English language literature regarding Tlatelolco
dictates the plethora of possibilities for future research to make meaningful contributions.
The insights gleaned from this study provide a basis on which further investigation of
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international press reactions to the massacre would be valuable in order to gain a more
holistic portrayal of the various responses to Tlatelolco. Additionally, a comprehensive
study of more Canadian and American newspapers could generate findings which were
not present in the newspapers examined in this thesis. By elongating the time period for
examination, investigation into if the reporting of the massacre changed in later months
and years could be made in addition to how the event was remembered.
Examining other popular media sources, such as television and radio coverage of
the massacre could add important insights into whether popular media was consistent in
its message or whether different forms of media created divergent messages regarding the
massacre.
The Mexico City Massacre, the Olympics, and its Place in History
The immediate connection many make between the massacre and the 1968
Olympic Games has been shown to be a non-causal connection and relationship.5 Perhaps
the tenuous connection between the massacre and the Olympic Games was best summed
up by Octavio Paz’s work, The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid. When discussing
the student unrest in Mexico and what it meant within Mexican society, Paz stated:
Although student uprisings are a world-wide phenomenon, they break out with the
greatest virulence in the most advanced societies. It could be said, therefore, that
the student movement and the Olympic Games in Mexico were complementary
events: both of them were signs that the country was relatively developed. What
was discordant, and anomalous, and unforeseen, was the attitude of the
government.6
Nevertheless, the government’s desire to host an Olympics free from student protests can
be fairly concluded as a precipitating factor to the level of force used against the students.
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In spite of Paz’s eloquence and undeniably exhaustive knowledge of Mexico, the
people, culture, and society, his view of the world press reacting in shock to the massacre
should not be categorically accepted. As shown in this thesis, the international media
response was highly nuanced and not generalizable given the striking differences in the
way the massacre was covered. Some outlets, such as the Times and the Post, did react
with shock and horror to the savage repression of the students. Other media outlets, such
as the Globe and the Citizen, described the event in a matter of fact manner, which did
not reflect shock but rather support for the government in its restoration of peace and
order before the Olympic Games.
On the 25th anniversary of the massacre, in 1993, the Mexican government
permitted a monument to be erected in commemoration of the massacre in the Plaza de la
Tres Culturas.7 Though a remembrance statue may stand in the Plaza, much remains
unresolved in the aftermath of the Mexico City massacre.
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